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This paper presents a detailed analysis of Philip Allott’s 1991 work Eunomia: New 
Order for a New World.  It begins by briefly framing the work in terms of what is 
here referred to as “the critical challenge” to international law, and suggests that one 
central goal of the text an attempted synthesis of the old opposition between 
philosophy and literature.  It then sketches an outline of the manner in which his 
thesis is constructed – noting, in doing so, that despite the scope and complexity of 
the book, there is relatively little in the way of standard academic argument to be 
found therein.  This leads on to the central focus of this paper: the manner in which 
Allott seeks to construct authority for the claims he makes and conclusions he reaches 
in the absence of such argumentation.  To this end, the main bulk of the paper is 
concerned, in a manner influenced by theorists such as Chaïm Perelman and James 
Boyd White, with performing a critical analysis of the rhetorics of the work.  It 
considers issues such as enacted dialectics; language; voice; metaphor; and technique; 
analysing each in turn for the way in which they function to bolster Allott’s otherwise 
nakedly – if eloquently – asserted claims.  It concludes that, while the early promise 
of Eunomia is undoubtedly that of confronting the irreducible contradictions and 
aporia identified as inevitable in the critical challenge to international law, these 
themes are gradually worked out and ultimately usurped – in both the rhetorics and 
the surface meaning of the text – by those of transcendence, unity and systemic 
completion; the hallmarks of Allott’s mystification of society. 
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THE RHETORIC OF EUNOMIA 
 
As to the style question, the esoteric style, I agree 
that essentially it is literature that one is trying to 
write.  I can’t see what the point of academic 
writing is. But literature is performative in 
character.  The act of doing it is its content and, 
insofar as I have had a strategy… that would be the 
strategy.  The influential books in the world have 
not been concerned with academic debates.  They 
have been performative events invoking the 
imagination of the reader to join in.1
 
Introduction 
International law has always, it seems, been blessed (or cursed) by a high degree of 
reflection by those working within the field upon its very existence and nature.  As 
David Kennedy has outlined in some detail,2 the discipline has changed and 
developed over time, sometimes gradually, sometimes in more dramatic ruptures, but 
with each change representing something of a shift in the manner in which the 
doctrinal fundamentals have been perceived and understood.  Theorists and 
practitioners of international law have long been forced to accept that their discipline 
is inhabited – indeed, constituted – by a number of conceptual couplets, or dualisms, 
that often seem to exist in relations of tension, if not outright opposition, and that have 
done much to structure the development of doctrine; dualisms, to name but a few, 
such as law/politics; sovereignty/community; rules/process, etc. Much scholarly 
endeavour has been addressed to finding the correct way in which the competing 
imperatives implicit in these terms can be worked out into an internally coherent and 
unified system of public international law. 
 
                                                 
1 Philip Allott, comments in “Thinking Another World: ‘This Cannot Be How the World Was Meant to 
Be’” (Review Essay Symposium on Philip Allott’s Eunomia and Health of Nations), 16 European 
Journal of International Law (2005) 255-297, p. 271. 
2 See e.g. David Kennedy, “When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box”, 32 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics (1999-2000) 335-500. 
 
 During the 1980s, however, certain voices on the critical periphery of the discipline, 
heavily influenced by the Critical Legal Studies movement, began taking a different 
approach to these dualisms, their role in international legal discourse and the way in 
which they structured argumentation within the discipline.  Although by no means the 
first work of its type in this genre, by far the most influential and comprehensive book 
on this topic was Koskenniemi’s From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of 
International Legal Argument, first published in 1989.  Along with a number of other 
key figures, in particular people like David Kennedy and Anthony Carty, 
Koskenniemi laid down a challenge to international law that has, for many, yet to 
receive a full and satisfactory answer, either from the mainstream or from the 
periphery of the discipline.  The basis for this challenge, which I will here refer to 
(perhaps, admittedly, somewhat reductively) as the critical challenge to international 
law, lay in two separate claims regarding the dualisms about which, as noted above, 
scholarship had long been conscious: their ubiquity (under, albeit, a variety of 
different guises) and their insolubility (the fact that they were not mere dualisms, but 
contradictions).   
 
For Koskenniemi and others, these doctrinal contradictions were mere reflections of a 
deeper problem at the heart of the liberal theory from which they were drawn: that 
there was simply no way in which, in a world of radically subjective values (a basic 
axiom of the “modern problematic”, as constructed by Koskenniemi at least),3 law 
could provide an entirely neutral and objective means of arbitrating between 
competing visions of the good.  Law, in the final instance, could not be rigorously and 
completely separated from politics, as the liberal ideal seemed to require. The critical 
challenge to international law is thus, at the most basic level, to attempt to formulate 
an understanding of international law that acknowledges the inevitably political nature 
of our legal arguments, and the ethical responsibility that this entails, without 
rejecting either the radical subjectivity of values or the impossibility of legal (or 
ethical) objectivity and neutrality. These arguments are by now so well known, and 
indeed widely accepted, as to have come to form in many ways part of the 
                                                 
3 Martii Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argumentation 
(Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company, 1989) p. 63. 
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 4disciplinary common sense;  I do not propose to rehearse them here.  What is worth 
noting is that, as a result of this critical work, those writing on international legal 
theory are, ultimately, faced with one of two choices: either reject the challenge, and 
reaffirm the possibility – in theory at least – of the modern ideal of objective, neutral 
and apolitical law; or take it up in its own terms, that is, accepting the ubiquity and 
irreducibility of the contradictions that inhabit international legal doctrine, and 
attempting to theorise the discipline anew on that basis. 
 
Much scholarship since the 1980s that has not been concerned with formulating this 
critical challenge itself has either chosen the first of these options, or simply failed to 
engage with it at all.  One striking exception to this can be found, however, in the 
work of Philip Allott, whose sprawling and complex oeuvre represents, at first glance 
at least, an ambitious attempt to perform precisely the second sort of response to the 
critical challenge to international law (which he himself had been prominent in 
formulating): it proceeds on the basis of the radical subjectivity, and hence necessary 
construction, of all ethics and law; rejects the possibility of an apolitical or objective 
neutral arbitration; and attempts from there to generate – at the highest level of 
abstraction possible – a general theory of what the future of international law, and 
international legal scholarship, should be.5  While Koskenniemi’s work in From 
Apology to Utopia was ostensibly an examination of disciplinary anxiety – why was 
international law constantly having, if not to prove, then to justify its existence? – 
Allott had already by this stage moved beyond this issue, and sought instead to infuse 
the discipline with a self-confident and robust general theory of its own functioning.  
The purpose of this paper, then, is to provide a detailed analysis of what is probably 
one of the earliest, and undoubtedly the most sustained, attempts to respond to the 
                                                 
4 See e.g. Gerry Simpson, “The Situation on the International Legal Theory Front: The Power of Rules 
and the Rule of Power”, 11 European Journal of International Law (2000) 439-464, at p. 439. 
5 The question may be asked at this point, why Eunomia as opposed to the more recent work, The 
Health of Nations: Society and Law Beyond the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)? 
The answer is twofold: firstly, Eunomia remains the most general and abstract attempt by Allott – 
perhaps by anybody – to respond to the critical challenge in the manner and at the level that I have 
sketched it here; secondly, and relatedly, it continues to provide the philosophical platform upon which 
much of his later work, including The Health of Nations, is based.  See also, for example, his more 
recent essays on “The Concept of International Law” 10 European Journal of International Law (1999) 
31-50 (which in many ways restates the thesis of Eunomia as it relates to the future conceiving of 
international law) and “The Emerging International Aristocracy”, 35 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics (2002-2003) 309-338 (which concludes (at p. 337) with a call for 
“systematic social transcendence” very clearly based upon the general theory set out in his first book). 
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 critical challenge in its own terms: Allott’s treatise entitled Eunomia: New Order for a 
New World.6   
 
7As Koskenniemi has noted,  some of the most immediately striking features of 
Allott’s writing are the numerous oddities of tone, style and technique of which he 
makes use.  This being said, it is perhaps surprising that few if any attempts have been 
made to engage not merely with what Allott is saying, but the crucial (and profoundly 
related) questions of how he is saying it and why he has chosen that way of expressing 
himself.  This is a book in which the reader can easily lose himself; it requires a 
lengthy period of sustained analysis in order to get much of any value out of it at all – 
and this, perhaps, is quite intentional on the part of the author.  Regrettably, this, 
coupled with Allott’s sometimes breathtaking ability to formulate propositions in new 
and surprising ways, has meant that there have been relatively few sustained attempts 
to get to grips with its content, broadly understood; all too often, where it is cited at 
all, it is used either as a sort of repository of ready-made (and readily-adaptable) 
quotations, or presented as a whole as general authority for the vaguest and most 
speculative of suggestions. 
 
Thus, until recently, scholarly interrogation of Allott’s work was largely limited to 
one or two short reviews of his published books,8 which, although illuminating, can 
scarcely do justice to what are remarkably difficult and complex works.  The situation 
has improved recently, however, particularly with the recent symposium on Allott’s 
work in the European Journal of International Law.9  Even in this context, however, 
surprisingly little attention is paid to the style, techniques and voice of Allott’s 
writing; only Koskenniemi’s contribution takes these considerations as central, 
                                                 
6 Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
7 Martii Koskenniemi, “International Law as Therapy: Reading The Health of Nations”, 16 European 
Journal of International Law (2005) 329-341, p. 331. 
8 See e.g. Anthony Carty, “Social Theory and the ‘Vanishing’ of International Law: A Review Article”, 
41 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1992) 939-945; Koskenniemi, “Eunomia: New 
Order for a New World: Review”, 87 American Journal of International Law (1993) 160-164. 
9 See generally Iain Scobbie, “Slouching Towards the Holy City: Some Weeds for Philip Allott”, 16 
European Journal of International Law (2005) 299-314; and, in the same volume, Karen Knop, 
“Eunomia is a Woman”, 315-328; Thomas Franck, “The Fervent Imagination and the School of Hard 
Knocks”, 343-346; Rosalyn Higgins, “Final Remarks”, 347-353; and Martii Koskenniemi, loc. cit. n. 7.  
Also noteworthy is the general discussion involving several different scholars, in the same journal, at 
255-297. 
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 10focusing on what he terms the “baroque aesthetic”  that characterises Eunomia and 
other works.  I will have cause to return to a number of Koskenniemi’s suggestions in 
what follows below; for the moment, however, in order to justify my contention that 
rhetorical analysis is crucial to any attempt to understand this book, I will focus on 
just one: the centrality of self-evidence to Allott’s claims. 
 
Koskenniemi draws attention, perhaps somewhat euphemistically, to “the absence of a 
political theory in Philip’s writing”.11  What I think he is referring to here is the fact 
that there is very little, despite the scope and complexity of the book, in the way of 
argument in support of the claims made in Eunomia.  Certainly, there are some 
relatively frequent allusions to logical – or, perhaps better, quasi-logical – 
progressions, but it is never necessary to retrace the justificatory steps too far back 
before arriving at what is essentially naked, if eloquent, assertion.  In short, as 
Koskenniemi notes, Allott, in the final instance, relies heavily on the self-evidence of 
his claims for their authority;12 they must stand or fall on their own persuasive ability, 
and, given the scope and degree of progression in the book, there is a sense in which 
the reader is either “in” or “out” from a very early stage.  White has noted that the 
appeal to self-evidence is “the most powerful appeal of all, when it works”;13 but, (as 
Perelman might have responded)14 when it doesn’t, when it fails to convince its 
audience, it is among the weakest. 
 
Another important, related point that might be mentioned in this regard is Allott’s 
own understanding, contained in the quote with which I began this paper, that his 
work should be read not as a standard academic text, but rather as a piece of 
literature.  Of course, viewing philosophy and literature as profoundly related, rather 
than conceptually distinct, endeavours is not new; in doing so, Allott can be seen as 
continuing a tradition that stretches back (at least) as far as Nietzsche, continues 
                                                 
10 Koskenniemi, loc. cit. n. 7. 
11 Ibid., p. 337. 
12 Ibid., p. 330. 
13 James Boyd White, Acts of Hope: Creating Authority in Literature, Law and Politics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 292. 
14 See e.g. Chaïm Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (London: Routledge, 
1963), p. 109-124.  He notes that “[a] proposition is ‘evident’, or, as is more often said in English, 
‘self-evident’, when anybody who can grasp the meaning of its terms is certain of its truth.  On this 
view the assent of the intellect, in contrast to that of the will, is a direct function of the entity which is 
grasped.  It is not in the power of the intellect to control or determine the degree of this assent…” (p. 
110). 
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 through much of the French existentialist thinkers such as Sartre and De Beauvoir, 
and found more contemporary expression in the works of thinkers as diverse as 
Foucault and Rorty (to name but a very few).  Indeed, the turn to literature can be 
seen in many ways as a recurring motif of those that share the basic philosophical 
commitments that underpin the critical challenge, broadly understood.  It is worth 
pausing to reflect briefly, however, on precisely what has driven this turn, and the 
implications of this for the type of claims that can be made. 
 
In 1958, the British playwright Harold Pinter wrote that “[t]here are no hard 
distinctions between what is real and what is unreal, nor between what is true and 
what is false. A thing is not necessarily either true or false; it can be both true and 
false”. In his speech in acceptance of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2005, he sought 
to nuance this claim in the following manner: 
 
I believe that these assertions still make sense and do still apply to the exploration of reality 
through art…. the real truth is that there never is any such thing as one truth to be found in 
dramatic art. There are many.  These truths challenge each other, recoil from each other, 
reflect each other, ignore each other, tease each other, are blind to each other. Sometimes you 
feel you have the truth of a moment in your hand, then it slips through your fingers and is 
lost.15
 
Throughout those philosophical works characterised by their embrace of literary 
principles, the common thread seems to be this radical rejection of the necessity of a 
singulat, unitary Truth in any given situation.  Rather, theory that inhabits a literary 
paradigm is constantly alive and sensitive to the existence of a plurality of different, 
often conflicting truths, irreducible to a single, coherent proposition; what White has 
referred to as the “art of many-voicedness”.16  Within this type of paradigm, the 
myriad ways in which authority can be constituted for the claims that we make is very 
properly, indeed of necessity primarily, the stuff of rhetorical analysis, in the 
expanded sense given to that term in the work of White and others; it speaks directly 
                                                 
15 See Harold Pinter’s Nobel Prize acceptance speech, Thursday 8th December 2005, available on the 
Guardian Unlimited website, http://books.guardian.co.uk/news/articles/0,6109,1661516,00.html.  
16 White, “Thinking About Our Language” 96 Yale Law Journal (1986-1987) 1960-1983, at p. 1966: 
“The art of all speech, all expression, thus lies in learning to qualify a language while we use it: in 
finding ways to recognize its omissions, its distortions, its false claims and pretensions, ways to 
acknowledge other modes of speaking that qualify or undercut it. The art of expression is the art of 
talking two ways at once: the art of many-voicedness”. 
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 not only to the relation that the author creates with his immediate audience, but also, 
ultimately, to the vision of community that he imagines and invites us to adhere to 
through his writings:  “What kind of community shall it be? How will it work? In 
what language shall it be formed? These are the great questions of rhetorical analysis. 
It thus always has justice and ethics – and politics, in the best sense of that term – as 
its ultimate subjects”.17
 
It is for these reasons that rhetorical analysis is crucial to the study of Eunomia, for it 
is only through this that we can get a sense of how Allott constructs the authority 
claims that he makes – how he proposes to induce the adherence of the reader, both to 
his premises and to his conclusions.  Given, then, the “absence of a political theory” 
in the work capable of justifying the claims made (either in a “top-down” or “bottom-
up” manner), we must look to the other ways in which they are made to appear 
authoritative, and ask what they hide and what broader arguments these invite us to 
commit ourselves to.   It is thus my view that there is considerably more going on in 
the rhetoric of Eunomia than there is in the surface meaning of the work, to the extent 
that such a distinction can be upheld at all.18  I must stress, however, that the critique 
presented here represents only my own struggle to get to grips with what is a hugely 
imaginative, complex and difficult work; and it is in this sense that the following 
pages are offered, in the hope that initiatives like the recent symposium in the 
European Journal will mark the beginning, and not the end, of a rich and detailed – 
and long overdue – conversation on Allott’s important contribution to the study of 
international society and its law. 
 
                                                 
17 James Boyd White, “Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life”, 
52 University of Chicago Law Review (1985) 684-702, at p. 695. 
18 It is worth noting at this point that this paper was originally written in the context of a broader 
attempt to rethink international law after the critical challenge, in which the idea of rhetoric plays a 
central role.  For my purposes here, however, it is important merely to acknowledge the extent to which 
my own thoughts in this regard – and the critique formulated in this paper – have been influenced by 
the writings of Chaïm Perelman and James Boyd White.  See generally Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca, Traité de l’argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique (Brussels: Editions de l’Université de 
Bruxelles, 4th ed. 1970); Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, trans. William Kluback 1982); White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal 
Criticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); White, Acts of Hope: Creating Authority in 
Literature, Law and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and White, Living Speech: 
Resisting the Empire of Force (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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 The Structures of Eunomia – An Overview 
It is quite simply impossible to condense a work such as Eunomia into a few short 
pages; no summary could ever hope to do justice to the complexity and depth of the 
book.19  Equally, however, it would not be appropriate to perform a rhetorical 
analysis without first attempting to outline some of its basic claims and trace some of 
the argumentative steps upon which its conclusions rely.  In this short section, 
therefore, I will seek to provide an analysis of his central claims, particularly with 
regard to the general theory of society that he constructs in the first two sections of the 
book, and which he then looks to apply, in the third, to international society and its 
law, with a view to making the rhetorical analysis that follows more comprehensible, 
and, I hope, to providing the necessary context to make my own conclusions in 
respect of the book more plausible.  In what follows, then, I will sketch the main 
themes upon which Allott imagines his theory of society and the manner in which 
they progress, before proceeding to an examination of the rhetorical techniques that 
he makes use of in order to infuse his claims with authority.20
 
The promise of the early, introductory chapters of Eunomia is unquestionably that of 
paradox, aporia and irreducible tension; the promise, if you will, of the literary 
paradigm.  Allott begins by outlining, at the most general level imaginable, a basic 
theory of, or at least approach to, language, according to which words are the basic 
building-blocks from which we constitute our individual and social realities – in his 
own terms, the “reality-for-itself” of the individual and of the society.  That he 
understands language as both contingent and constructive is immediately clear: he 
states, in characteristically unequivocal terms, that “to choose our words is to choose 
a form of life.  To choose our words is to choose a world”,21 and that “the permanence 
of a world is a powerful illusion”.22 23 Moreover, in terms that echo closely White’s,  
                                                 
19 It is often best, in these situations, to let the author speak for himself; which is why perhaps most 
useful summary of the main themes of the book is to be found in Allott, “Reconstituting Humanity - 
New International Law”, 3 European Journal of International Law (1992) 219-252.  The “Synopsis” 
contained in Chapter 20 of Eunomia is of little or no use to those who have not actually read the book. 
20 In proceeding in this manner, I naturally do not intend to suggest that we can separate entirely what 
he says from how he says it; of course, the meaning of the former is to a very large degree constituted 
in the latter.  Nonetheless, this does not mean that the distinction between, for example, surface and 
enacted meaning, although admittedly artificial to a degree, cannot be useful in performing a rhetorical 
analysis of a text.  
21 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §1.11. 
22 Ibid., at §1.18. 
23 See e.g. James Boyd White, Justice as Translation, op. cit n. 18, at pp. 3-21. 
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 Allott argues that our vocabulary often seems inadequate to the task we set it, that of 
encapsulating and rendering communicable all that which we experience:24 “by one 
and the same process, our capacity to communicate expands as the social constraints 
on our imagination increase.”25  Language, then, for Allott, is the basic tool from 
which human beings construct their world of consciousness; and yet, the words that 
constitute it are never able to provide a perfect reflection of reality, either of the 
physical world or that of individual (or, indeed, social) experience.  Instead, humans 
construct and develop their shifting meanings only in and through their usage; and 
this, as Allott acknowledges, necessarily introduces an irreducible element of 
uncertainty and tension into the very building-blocks of human consciousness. 
 
This idea is then picked up and developed in the next (again, essentially introductory) 
chapter, in which Allott turns his attention to the notion of consciousness; this he 
defines as the mind’s ability to study its own functioning, its capacity of “ordering its 
own activity”.26  Again, the idea of irreducible tension is very prevalent in his 
discussion here, focusing on the manner in which doubt functions as the basic motor 
of rationality: 
 
Reason has sought, over and over again, to doubt itself.  It is as if it were a necessary part of 
the functioning of reason that it should constantly oppose itself…  It has been a dialectical 
process, a constant interaction, dialogue, struggle between the integrating and disintegrating 
tendencies of the mind… The result has been that humanity has never achieved a state of 
unquestionable certainty on any matter, has never fallen into any settled and total uncertainty, 
and has experienced an incalculable number of degrees of certainty between the two 
extremes.27
 
The conflict that this inevitably generates is not merely the cause of “a sort of anguish 
or pain or noise”28 within the consciousness that recognises tensions between two or 
more ideas that it holds; it can also be a productive force, as consciousness seeks to 
synthesise it, and thus “generate a new idea that is more than the old ones without 
negating them”.  Nonetheless, such synthesis is not always forthcoming, and is never 
                                                 
24 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §1.12. 
25 Ibid., at §3.3. 
26 Ibid., at §2.11. 
27 Ibid., at §2.9-2.10. 
28 Ibid., at §2.31 
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 absolutely final in any event, as new tensions are introduced by the attempt to 
integrate the new idea within consciousness;29 thus it is that Allott speaks of the 
“endless pattern of conflict and equilibrium”.30 This is perhaps the earliest 
introduction into the work of the basic dialectical assumptions that drive the theory of 
Eunomia. 
 
Perhaps the clearest example of Allott’s adherence to the basic philosophical 
commitments that had driven the critical challenge comes, however, in his discussion 
of what he calls the “perennial dilemmas of society”.31  In terms similar to those that I 
have used here, he argues that “social life is a perpetual struggle with the obscure 
duality of the human condition”.32  He then proceeds to break down this aporia into “a 
series of dilemmas in which the ambiguous duality of the human condition is lived 
socially”, namely the self and the other; the one and the many; unity of nature, 
plurality of value; justice and social justice; and new citizens, old laws.33 Crucially, 
he goes on to note that “[t]he word dilemma is here used to refer to a situation in 
which consciousness is presented with possibilities which are seemingly in conflict, 
contradictory, incompatible, irreconcilable, and which cannot be finally resolved or 
eliminated, but which can never be evaded”.34
 
It is worth noting at this point a distinction of fundamental importance that Allott 
introduces early on in the book: that between what he posits as the three “levels” of 
theory practical, pure, and transcendental: “Practical theory is the set of ideas on the 
basis of which actions are willed.  Pure theory is the set of ideas which are used to 
explain practical theory.  Transcendental theory is the set of ideas which are used to 
explain pure theory”.35  Not, however, that one of the three should be viewed as in 
some sense philosophically prior to the others; rather, they all exist in a relationship of 
mutual reinforcement.  Allott is quite clear: the purpose of Eunomia is to provide a 
                                                 
29 Ibid., at §2.33-2.34.  Later in the book, Allott goes so far as to acknowledge that consciousness “must 
contain conflicting ideas” (§5.8, emphasis added). 
30 Ibid., at §2.36 (emphasis added). 
31 On this, see generally ibid., chapters 4-6; for a summary, see also Allott, loc. cit. n. 12, at §13.1-
13.12. 
32 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §4.9. 
33 Ibid., at §4.10. 
34 Ibid., at §4.11. 
35 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §2.49. 
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 36pure theory of society,  one that is potentially universal insofar as it is “capable of 
being the theory acted upon by all participants in international society”.37
 
It is, I think, in these definitions that we can find the key to the puzzling lack of 
standard argumentation and justification that characterises Eunomia.  Allott’s goal, as 
noted above, is to provide a pure theory of society; by his own definitions, this can be 
justified, or “reinforced”, only with reference to the practical theories that it makes 
possible (in Allott’s terminology, the “potential co-ordinate” of reason)38 or through 
its deduction from a transcendental theory – “the set of ideas” that makes possible “a 
set of ideas explaining other ideas (the “genetic co-ordinate” of reason).39  There is no 
suggestion in Allott’s taxonomy that a pure theory is capable of furnishing its own 
justifications; indeed, he explicitly states the contrary.  Allott, however, steadfastly 
refuses to countenance any forays into the realm of practical theory, instead noting 
simply that a pure theory, such as his, can generate a wide array of different – we may 
even suggest conflicting – practical theories;40 and neither is there any real attempt to 
develop anything that might be recognisable as a transcendental theory in terms of 
which the theory he is proposes might be justified.  The author himself has recently 
summed up the book thus: 
 
In Eunomia I postulate the idea that societies have a theory of themselves.  Over time they 
construct an idea or image, an analytical construct – theories of what the principles of society 
are.  To a very perceptive insider and perhaps to a slightly less perceptive outsider, it is 
possible to identify the theory of society, which then means that most things in the society 
become deductive… This raises the very interesting question of what the theory of 
international society is (or could be).41
 
Allott’s goal, then, is both to identify the prevailing theory of international society 
(which he locates in the Vattelian tradition),42 and then to critique it in the light of his 
pure theory of society – a vision of what society, including international society, 
                                                 
36 See e.g. ibid., at §2.51 and §12.28. 
37 Ibid., preface, at xlviii.  The congruence between this definition of universality and Perelman’s 
definition of philosophical thought, justified in terms of its intended appeal to a “universal audience”, is 
certainly noteworthy.  See Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, op. cit n. 18, at pp. 40-46. 
38 Ibid., at §2.26. 
39 Ibid., at §2.54. 
40 Ibid., at §2.53. 
41 Allott, loc. cit. n. 1, at p. 257-258. 
42 Ibid., p. 258; see also Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §13.105. 
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 could become.  The difficulty here should be evident: in the absence of either a 
transcendental theory to justify his pure theory, or a potential practical theory that 
could reinforce it, Allott must rely on an appeal to self-evidence to support his claims 
– not only his characterisation of the then prevailing theory of international society as 
essentially Vattelian, but also for the construction of the pure theory in the light of 
which he critiques the status quo.  The first part of the argument has a largely 
empirical element, much more amenable to claims of self-evidence; the second, 
however – which Allott openly acknowledges as “utopian” – is much harder to justify 
in this manner.  In effect, Allott defines his own goals and terms of reference in such a 
manner as to compel him to claim self-evidence for his utopian vision; and it is this 
that in many ways necessitates the adoption of the imaginative rhetoric that pervades 
the entire book. 
 
This being said, there are, in my view, a number of suggestive passages, particularly 
in the early stages of the book, that hint provocatively at elements of the 
transcendental theory upon which Allott might seek to justify his work.  As the focus 
of the book is on pure theory, however, these are dealt with in a manner that is at best 
cursory, introduced as the result of sometimes surprisingly brief and broad analyses, 
and themselves receiving little more than assertion by way of justification.  Perhaps 
the best example of this is provided by his attempt to justify the type of pure theory 
that he is proposing: after an overview of what he views as the seven main different 
types or schools of philosophy (conducted in just a few short paragraphs), Allott 
reaches the following startling conclusion: 
 
In summary, it may be said that the long and complex story of consciousness-considering-
consciousness implies the following common ground. (1) Human reflective consciousness has 
recognized in itself a process of self-ordering which calls for an explanation, an explanation 
which must ultimately imply, if it cannot ever wholly articulate in words, a general theory of 
consciousness itself and probably a general theory of the nature of all reality…43
 
It is from this that Allott first sets out the hypothesis of the book; a hypothesis that 
“seeks to identify the necessary system of reason as a particular mode of functioning 
of consciousness”.  He then goes on to note that “such a hypothesis would not only 
                                                 
43 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §2.23. 
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 cover the reasoning of the mind of the individual human being but also the social 
aspect of reason, the communal ordering of consciousness in society”.44  In doing so, 
he introduces two more ideas that are of central importance to his thesis as a whole 
(and to which I will have occasion to return later): firstly, that individual reality and 
social reality, individual consciousness and the “consciousness” of society, are two 
types of the same basic system, that function according to the same basic rules;45 and 
secondly, that both the physical and social worlds, the reality-in-itself of the non-
human sphere and the reality-for-itself created by consciousness, are made up of units 
that are themselves microcosms of the whole, each obeying a structure and a system 
that is governed by the same general rules, the same pure theory.  It is this latter point 
that Koskenniemi refers to as the “Baroque aesthetic” in Allott’s work;46 to me, in 
doing so, he underestimates its significance – a point to which I will return below.  
For the moment, it is sufficient to note that, although much if not all of the 
argumentative platform of Eunomia collapses if these three elements of a 
transcendental theory outlined above are not accepted, they themselves receive little if 
anything in the way of justification beyond their mere assertion.  Once again, it is in 
the rhetorics of the piece that Allott constructs their authority. 
 
It is, however, through these elements of a transcendental theory that Allott begins to 
undermine the notion of irreducible and irredeemable conflict – so central to the 
critical challenge and so evident in the opening chapters of Eunomia – and replace it 
with a vocabulary of reconciliation and transcendence, in such a manner as to begin to 
progress (or, depending on your viewpoint, regress) towards a much more classically 
philosophical standpoint.  One example of this is in his assertion that society is “a 
totality, an integrated structure, a self-coherent system”;47 another is provided by the 
following passage, ostensibly on religion: 
 
Religion is as natural to a human being as thinking.  To will and to act is, for a human being, 
to will and act through consciousness in accordance with value under the impulsion of desire 
and within the constraint of obligation.  It is natural, therefore, that reflexive and reflective 
consciousness will seek to find a theory to reconcile, within a single structure of significance, 
                                                 
44 Ibid., §2.24. 
45 Allott’s most sustained assertions of the equivalence between individual and social reality are in 
ibid., ch. 9. 
46 Koskenniemi, loc. cit. n. 7. 
47 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §9.30 
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 all willing and acting, all values, all desire and obligation, all of the impulse of life and all of 
the necessity of the universe.  Such is the function of religion.48
 
Here already we can see that the idea of perennial dilemmas, and the tensions and 
contradictions that drive them, is giving way to notions of theory very much in the old 
“grand style” of Philosophy.  Allott here is keen to characterise as natural the search, 
not merely for a coherent and unified theory of the individual and social worlds of 
consciousness, but for a general theory that could account, “within a single structure 
of significance”, for both the reality-for-itself of consciousness and the reality-in-
itself of the physical world, and presumably for the interactions between the two.  
That Allott’s utopian vision has a decidedly religious element to it has been remarked 
upon;49 and we may take it that this passage is an attempt to justify – through 
assertion supported by rhetorical devices – his own project of determining the 
overarching, reconciling, synthesising principle of societal order.50  The existence of 
such a principle – a fundamental postulate of Allott’s pure theory – is supported, in 
the surface meaning of the text at least, only by reference to the transcendental hints 
of the early chapters.  The rhetoric of the above passage, and others like it, is 
something that I will again have cause to return to below.  
 
As the book progresses, then, notions of conflict, tension and contradiction 
increasingly assume a back seat, to be replaced by those of reconciliation, integration 
and surpassing or transcendence.  Duality is replaced by an increasing reference to 
ideas of unity and coherence.  As noted above, society is compared to the individual – 
the constitution of the former being equivalent to the personality of the latter.51  Allott 
then asserts that each society – “from the society of the particular family up to and 
including the society of the whole human race”52 – has three constitutions: the legal, 
the actual and the ideal; in these, society’s struggle with the perennial dilemmas is 
played out, generating what he refers to as the “total social process” of that particular 
                                                 
48 Ibid., at §6.19. 
49 See e.g. Anthony Anghie’s comments in “Thinking Another World”, loc. cit. n. 1, at p. 277. 
50 Chapter 8 of Eunomia is preceded by the following quote from Boethius: “It is not surprising if 
ignorance of the principle of its order makes people think that an idea is unplanned and chaotic.” 
51 Ibid., at §9.2. 
52 This is a favourite and recurring phrase in the work, indicating the transcendental element of the 
microcosm that I refer to above; see e.g. ibid., at §11.16 
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 53society.   The legal, actual and ideal constitutions are defined, respectively, as “a 
constitution that presents its [society’s] past as an actuality, a constitution which is 
contained in its willing and acting, and a constitution which contains the possibilities 
of its future”.54  He then introduces the central concept of the “social exchange”, the 
means by which natural power is “exchanged” by individuals for social power (that is, 
power exercised for the purposes of society),55 most often in the form of legal 
relations, viewed as mechanisms for “integrating” (read synthesising) “the willing and 
acting of members of society… with the willing and acting of society”:56
 
Social power comes from the nature and functioning of the society as a structure-system, 
capable of making transformations which turn its possibilities into actualities, which transform 
its future into its past, which achieve its purposes.  Social power is energy transformed for the 
purposes which flow from the systemic structure of society.  To achieve its purpose, society 
transforms natural power into social power and transforms social power into natural power.  
This is the social exchange.57
 
Allott thus presents the social exchange, of natural power for social power in the form 
of legal relations, as the synthesis of individual and social purposes, in terms that 
strongly recall those of the Hegelian dialectic: “By the social exchange in the form of 
legal relations, society is able to universalize the willing of its individual members 
and to particularize its own willing within the willing of its members”.58  Again, 
however, it is important to note that none of the profoundly complex and difficult 
argument that went into Hegel’s elaboration of his dialectical method is present in 
Allott’s work; instead, we are presented with dialectical resolution as a fait accompli, 
based upon nothing more than the assertion of the functioning of the “social 
exchange”, itself a product of the “total social process” of society. 
 
Allott later uses this framework as a means of interpreting the various stages in the 
development of society, from the notion of unlimited sovereignty towards that of 
                                                 
53 Ibid., at §12.65. 
54 Ibid., at §9.6.  See also Allott, loc. cit. n. 12, at §11.1-11.3. 
55 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §10.22; see also §17.29. 
56 Ibid., at §10.32. 
57 Ibid., at §10.19. 
58 Ibid., at §20.14; see also §10.59.  For the importance of the synthesis of universal and particular 
interests to the Hegelian dialectic, see e.g. G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right (Chicago: 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), at p.280 (additions). 
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 democracy.  He asserts first that “democracy is the dialectical successor of 
sovereignty”,59 and then proceeds to justify this statement by outlining the 
progression, through the occurrence of “social exchange… at the level of theory”, first 
to the notion of “constitutional sovereignty”, and then, by dialectical progression 
founded on the “unpromising paradox” of limited sovereignty, arriving at the ideal of 
democracy, “by finding a basis of all social power not merely in the idea and the fact 
of authority but in the constitution of society”: 
 
In a fateful act of mutual self-creating, the people and the government made each other, 
the one as the embodiment of society, the other as the embodiment of the state.  The 
citizens surrendered to government, as government surrendered to the citizens.  Each, 
in doing so, empowered the other.  Thus did state-society surpass itself as state-
society.60
 
Here we can clearly see how the framework that he has constructed in terms of the 
dialectical power of the social exchange allows him to develop an interpretation of 
history in which democracy, as “a universalizing of particular wills in the willing of 
society” that “naturally seeks the universal purpose of all wills in society, naturally 
seeks to universalize all particular desire”,61 came to “solve” the classic pouvoir 
constituant/ pouvoir constitué dichotomy as the ideally-suited dialectical counterpart 
to the pursuit of justice through the legal relations generated by the social exchange.  
Allott’s point, of course, is not that this actually happened, but rather that, at the level 
of ideal theory, democracy came to conceive of itself in this way, and thus to create 
the possibility of this future for society within its ideal constitution.  He never 
suggests that such an ideal functioning is a practically attainable goal.  This point, 
however, is not of particular importance; although it does mean that Allott’s theory on 
this (or, indeed, any other) point cannot be debunked by a crude empirical assault (“it 
doesn’t work that way!”), it cannot hide the fact that his attempt to construct a pure, 
ideal theory of society rests upon a set of assertions of the theoretical possibility of 
perfect dialectical synthesis, the only justification for which offered to his audience is, 
ultimately, their self-evidence. 
 
                                                 
59 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §13.2. 
60 Ibid., at §13.21. 
61 Ibid., at §13.31. 
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 Allott’s next crucial step – in some senses the centrepiece of the entire theory – is to 
introduce the central tenets of his pure theory of society.  These he refers to as “the 
generic principles of the constitution”, which are “shared by all the constitutions of all 
societies”.62  It is certainly worth recalling at this point Allott’s expansive 
understanding of the notion of society: essentially, anything and everything that 
involves two or more humans in a more-or-less structured setting, from individual 
families, through sports teams, businesses, right up to international organisations, 
states, and the international society of the whole human race.63  These, then, “are the 
principles which integrate the social process of society into a total social process, a 
total structure and a total system, a whole”,64 and they are a set of hypotheses 
 
intended to perform a similar explanatory function to that of general hypothetical principles in 
the natural sciences – the principles of Newtonian mechanics, thermodynamics, relativity, 
quantum mechanics, genetics.  They are offered as the ultimate equations relating to 
constituted power in society, the constitution of constitutions as it were.65
 
He then suggests the following seven basic principles: law is part of the total social 
process (the principle of integration); law is dynamic (the principle of 
transformation); all legal power is delegated power (principle of delegation); all legal 
power is limited (principle of the intrinsic limitation of power); all social power is 
under the law (principle of the supremacy of law); all legal power is in the social 
interest (principle of the supremacy of the social interest); and all social power is 
accountable (principle of social responsibility).66
 
Of prime importance here is the issue of how he attempts to provide authority for the 
proposition that these seven hypothetical principles constitute the meta-ordering 
framework for all societies everywhere.  In this regard, he makes three distinct claims: 
firstly, that they are analytically necessary to the coherence of his proposed theory;67 
secondly, that they are intended to make sense of human social experience, and as 
such must be judged in the “potential co-ordinate” of reason, not inductively from 
                                                 
62 Ibid., at §11.3. 
63 See e.g. ibid., at §3.37. 
64 Ibid., at §11.4. 
65 Ibid., at §11.8. 
66 Ibid., at §11.5; see also Allott, loc. cit. n. 12, at §14.1-14.3. 
67 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §11.6. 
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 68facts or deductively from philosophy;  and thirdly, and perhaps most surprisingly, 
that they are in some important sense analogous or equivalent to the hypotheses of 
natural science whose function they are intended to perform.69  The first two display, 
to my mind, a significant element of circularity: their analytical necessity to the theory 
of Eunomia cannot justify their assertion, unless the broader claims to self-evidence 
that have already been made are accepted; and, if they are to be judged in the potential 
co-ordinate of reason (in terms of their relation to our other ideas of society and its 
possibilities), then we are in effect being asked to validate them on the basis of their 
capacity to bring about Allott’s utopian vision – which again relies ultimately on its 
own self-evidence.70
 
The third claim relies on two separate points relating to the hypotheses of natural 
science: firstly, that they are sufficiently coherent with other ideas that we have about 
the physical world to allow us to postulate that there is a reality that can enable such 
principles to be generated within consciousness; and secondly that the substantive 
content of these principles is such that it allows humans to will and act in the physical 
world as if they understood its principles, despite the epistemological limits on human 
knowledge.  Scientific principles can be valid in these two senses, even if they are 
“incapable of transcending themselves to explain themselves”.  The first claim, then, 
is one of general coherence within an overall structure of ideas that is generally 
effective; the second concerns the related issue of our ability to rely on the application 
of the principles to create more-or-less predictable results.  Remarkably, Allott then 
suggests that the same thing is true of his generic principles of all constitutions: in 
terms, for example, of the second, essentially empirical claim, he argues that his 
principles “…enable human consciousness to act in society as if it understood the 
nature and functioning of law as a self-ordering system of society, to act as if 
consciousness were the master of the structure-system which it has created for 
itself”.71  The rhetorical construction of functional equivalencies between the social 
and physical worlds is something that I shall return to in considerably more detail 
                                                 
68 Ibid., at §11.7. 
69 Ibid., at §11.9-11.10. 
70 In relation to this point, it is important to recall that we are not being asked to judge these generic 
principles as elements of a practical theory (that is, as desirable goals that society may choose to value) 
but rather of a pure theory (that is, as expressive of the nature and the functioning of all societies, 
regardless of whether they choose them or not). 
71 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §11.10. 
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 below; suffice it here to say that the force of this justification can be empirically 
falsified.  If the hypotheses of science stand or fall on whether they predict accurately 
or disappoint the manner in which the physical world actually functions, then any 
attempt to shift that kind justification through analogous reason onto the hypothetical 
principles governing all constitutions must also be subject to a similar kind of 
empirical verification.  In doing so, Allott must descend from the abstract and ideal 
arguments that characterise most of the rest of the book, and submit his principles to 
the actual, and not the potential, co-ordinate of reason, where they would surely often 
be found wanting in even the most advanced and civilised of societies.  To put the 
matter somewhat glibly, one can’t help but wonder if the laws of Newtonian 
mechanics would have enjoyed the widespread adherence that they have, had they 
proved so frequently disappointing whenever attempts to will and act had been based 
upon them. 
 
The generic principles of all constitutions, then, provide yet another example of a 
crucial step – this time perhaps the crucial step – in Allott’s theory that relies upon the 
self-evidence of its rightness (backed up with some rhetorical flair) for any authority 
that it enjoys in the mind of the reader.  Taken together, the constructions that I have 
outlined in this section (and in particular the social exchange, the generic principles of 
the constitution, and the general dialectical method) constitute the foundations for the 
analysis and critique of, and prescriptions for, international society and its law that 
Allott provides us with in the third section of the book.  None of them receive much in 
the way of justification for their inclusion in the theory; nevertheless, he proceeds to 
use them as the theoretical basis for passionate and often startling assertions of his 
global utopian vision.  As presented here, they do not appear particularly convincing;  
however, the analysis that I have performed until this point cannot hope to convey the 
sense of the book and the force of its claims, quite simply because they are not 
constructed through a process of argumentation in the familiar style of ordinary 
academic writing.  Rather, as in all important works of literature, they are developed, 
enacted, in the prose itself; thus, it is through the use of a wide and varied range of 
rhetorical techniques, and not merely the quasi-logical progressions of standard 
argumentation, that Allott seeks to lead us to the recognition that what he is proposing 
is both right and evident (at least to the extent that we should choose to adopt it as our 
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 72pure theory of society);  so that, as one reviewer put it, it seems to us that he 
“continually articulates in the most startling and original ways what many of us 
recognize as obvious when we see it stated thus”.73  Any interrogation of his work, 
then, that contents itself with an examination of the surface meaning of his text 
misses, as I hope the preceding section has suggested and the following one will 
confirm, what is in some senses the most important part of the theory: the ways in 
which it seeks to constitute authority for the claims it makes, by means other than 
those of standard, propositional academic argumentation.   It is only then that we will 
be in a position to formulate a judgment on the conclusions of the book, and, more 
importantly, to consider the extent to which it can be viewed as a response, persuasive 
or otherwise, to the critical challenge to international law. 
 
The Rhetoric of Eunomia 
How, then, does Allott seek to gain the adherence of his audience to the principles and 
methods of his theory, most notably its dialectical method, its understanding of the 
“social exchange”, and its postulation of the “generic principles of society”, given the 
lack of explicit justification of any of these elements in the text itself?  The answer, as 
I have already suggested, lies in the oddities of style, tone and technique that 
characterise this and much of his other work.74 These should not, then, be regarded as 
simply eccentricity or linguistic flair, having little or no important bearing on the 
content and the persuasiveness of the book; rather, they all individually play an 
important role – and together, an essentially constitutive one – in terms of the 
persuasive, hence rhetorical, force of the piece.  They should thus, when considering 
their effect upon the reader, be considered as a whole; however, for the sake of clarity, 
I propose here to break them down into the following categories: enacted dialectics;75 
                                                 
72 See e.g. §19.25. 
73 See the comment from the reviewer from the American Political Science Review, quoted on the back 
cover of Eunomia. 
74 As Koskenniemi notes, for example, in the context of The Health of Nations, “A few lines of this 
text, and every international lawyer will know who has written them”.  Not all of Allott’s work is like 
this, however; for example, his earlier article, “Language, Method and the Nature of International 
Law”, in Koskenniemi, ed., International Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992) 63-120, and his more 
recent piece on “The emerging International Aristocracy, loc. cit. n. 3, are both much less esoteric in 
style and content. 
75 It should be noted that here I am referring to dialectics in the sense that the method appears in 
Allott’s work, that is, as a basic version of its Hegelian variation.  In using the term “enacted dialectics” 
at this point, I do not have White’s interpretation of the enactment of the Platonic dialectical method in 
the Socratic dialogues, in which Plato deliberately puts specious “proofs” into Socrates’ mouth during 
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 language; voice; metaphor; and technique.  I will then examine how these function as 
justifications for some strong conclusions, ultimately based upon what I will term 
Allott’s mystification of international society, before concluding by reconsidering 
Allott’s general project in the light of the basic elements driving the critical challenge 
to international law. 
 
Enacted dialectics 
As already noted, Allott’s theory is based, to a large degree, on the postulation of a 
particular dialectic method; expressed most clearly, perhaps, in his insistence that, as 
a result of the social exchange, “law is the socialization of particular desire, the 
particularization of social desire”.76  There is, however, none of the complex and 
involved justification of this method that we find, for example, in the work of its 
major modern proponent, Hegel; rather, Allott simply asserts that society and its law 
can and do function in this manner.  It is not, however, a naked assertion; rather, in an 
example of what Kenneth Burke has referred to as a qualitative progression,77 the 
reader is prepared for, and thus more ready to accept, its introduction when it comes 
through the use certain other non-explicit examples of dialectic (broadly understood) 
that are largely implicit in the construction of the book itself.  In this way, Allott 
introduces a sense or a spirit of dialectical progression into his work that makes its 
explicit assertion, when it comes, less surprising and more readily accepted. There are 
a number examples of this in his work; here, I want to mention just two of the most 
obvious. 
 
The first, that cannot fail to strike the reader in his very first encounter with the book, 
can be termed the enacted dialectic of novelty and pedigree.  Everything about the 
book seems new and different: the programme, the language, the style, and even the 
author’s approach to the conventions of punctuation – many of which I will have 
                                                                                                                                            
dialogues in order to “teach” the reader, who is led by his frustration with Socrates’ presentation of the 
argument to engage in a sort of dialectical reason himself with the text.  See White, “The Ethics of 
Argument: Plato’s Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer”, 50 University of Chicago Law Review (1983) 
849-895, at pp. 863-866. 
76 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §14.5. 
77 Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement (Berkley: University of California Press, 1931) at p. 31: “Form is 
the creation of an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite”. He 
then goes on to define qualitative progression, one of the five aspects of form that he identifies, in the 
following manner (at p. 125): “…such progressions are qualitative rather than syllogistic as they lack 
the pronounced anticipatory nature of the syllogistic progression.  We are prepared less to demand a 
certain qualitative progression than to recognize its rightness after the event”.   
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 cause to examine in more detail below.  At the same time, he insists that he is engaged 
in a rehabilitation of a kind of philosophical thought that had lost credibility in the 
twentieth century: the project of elaborating a “universal”,78 “general theory of 
society and law”.79  Perhaps the most obvious instance can be found in the title of the 
book itself: Eunomia – which, we are told, is the ancient Greek term for the principles 
of the well-ordered society – immediately followed by its subtitle: New Order for a 
New World.  The tension here is quite obvious (and, I’m sure, quite intentional): we 
have the employment of ancient terminology to describe, and prescribe, an entirely 
novel situation; and this is a theme that recurs throughout the book, although it is 
bound to be particularly pronounced, for the reader, in its early stages.  Time and 
again Allott emphasises the novelty of his work; often not explicitly, but through the 
bewildering array of new terms that he introduces and his simultaneous 
problematisation of old ones, through his innovative reformulations of familiar 
problems, and through his refusal to provide any references to those authors upon 
whose work he openly acknowledges his own theory draws.80  On the other hand, 
however, awareness of the pedigree of his project is rarely far from the surface: this 
can be seen, for example, in both the antiquity and the variety of the quotations with 
which he begins each section of his work, and is perhaps even more pronounced in his 
stylistic decision to systematically number his paragraphs.  This latter technique is 
perhaps one of the most visible ways in which Allott seeks to reinscribe his project 
within the “great tradition”, not only of philosophy but also of religion.81   
 
Thus Allott, from the very outset, enacts in the mind of the reader the impression that 
his theory is a product of the dialectical interplay between the old and the new, a 
synthesis of the goals of the great tradition of philosophy and the unfamiliar 
exigencies of contemporary international society.   The effect of this on the authority 
of his claims in Eunomia is manifold: not only, for example, are we rhetorically 
prepared for – and thus less likely to object to – the introduction, when it comes, of a 
                                                 
78 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, preface, at li. 
79 Ibid., at xlviii.  Allott is much more forthcoming on this point in the new preface to the 2001 edition 
of Eunomia (see e.g. p. xxix), and even more so in his comments in “Thinking Another World”, loc. 
cit. n. 1, at p. 259, where he refers to current philosophy as “orphaned” by the “20th-century madness of 
self-doubting, self-examination, self-deconstruction…”, calling for a return to the “great tradition” of 
philosophy (at p. 256).   
80 See Eunomia, op. cit. n. 6, preface to 2001 edition, at xxx. 
81 See e.g. Anthony Anghie’s comments in “Thinking Another World”, loc. cit. n. 1, at p. 277. 
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 basic dialectical method as the motor of the pure theory of society that he proposes, 
but he is also able to claim a sort of diffuse authority for that method (it is, after all, 
recognisably Hegelian) without having to confront any of the criticisms that 
subsequent scholars have levelled at it.  This latter point is true in general of the 
philosophical theories upon which Allott draws but which he does not explicitly 
acknowledge; the fact that they are familiar to us makes their assertion less jarring, 
whereas the fact that they are neither rigorously formulated nor particularly 
developed, nor provided with a citation to works in which they do receive a more 
elaborate treatment, makes the task of criticism seem both more difficult and less 
urgent.  We may note that this is particularly the case in the context of what 
Koskenniemi has called the “Baroque aesthetic”82 of Allott’s work, but which Allott 
has openly acknowledged as the product of a philosophical influence: the idea, central 
to his theory, that the structure and functioning of each element of the universe 
mirrors that of the whole.83
 
The now-curious technique of numbering paragraphs links in with the novel tone of 
Allott’s writings, to provide us with an example that is not merely that of novelty and 
pedigree, but in fact points to a second, more profound instance of enacted dialectic in 
Eunomia, one that, for me, goes to the very heart of the fundamental project of the 
book: that of philosophy and literature.  As Koskenniemi has suggested, the 
numbering of paragraphs suggests as certain systematicity; the idea that “each idea is 
precisely where it should be”,84 very reminiscent, for example, of thinkers in the great 
philosophical tradition such as Hegel.  Having made this connection, the reader is 
immediately surprised by the juxtaposition of the content and tone of these 
paragraphs: the disinterested, objective mood that the mode of presentation lead us to 
expect is conspicuous only in its absence; and, in its place, is the excited and 
passionate voice of the polemicist.  It is, as Koskenniemi notes,85 the voice of 
Zarathustra (or, at least, someone who sounds like him);86 this time, however, he is 
speaking in numbered paragraphs! 
 
                                                 
82 Koskenniemi, loc. cit. n. 7. 
83 Allott, op. cit. n. 6. 
84 Koskenniemi, loc. cit. n. 7, at p. 333. 
85 Ibid., at p. 331. 
86 See infra n. 160. 
 23
 This almost comical juxtaposition illustrates nicely what is, to my mind, the central 
enacted dialectic of Eunomia: we are constantly confronted with the tension between 
the overtly rhetorical style and the explicitly philosophical goals of the book.  It is 
clearly present, for example, in his choice of quotations with which each section 
begins, and the work in general ends; they are drawn not only from an impressive 
range of time and culture, but also – and again, I’m sure, quite deliberately – from 
both overtly philosophical and purely literary works.  More visible, perhaps, is the 
presence of this enacted dialectic within the basic terms of the theory itself, as can be 
seen from the foundational, and equally important, roles accorded to the notions of 
imagination and reason; the former creates the world-for-itself of consciousness, 
while the latter orders it.87  The implication of this is clear: whilst the “great tradition” 
would view only reason as properly philosophical, relegating imagination to the non-
scientific, artistic realm of literature, in Eunomia both are given a central role in the 
creation of a pure theory of society’s self-constituting.  In these and myriad other 
ways, Allott suggests – again, never quite explicitly – that the opposition between 
literature and philosophy (at least, philosophy in the tradition that he favours) can be 
transcended. 
 
As the quote from Allott with which I began this paper suggests, then, he has 
abandoned the dry, formal style of standard academic writing in favour of a fluid, 
literary prose; a decision that has significant implications for the manner in which 
both meaning and authority are generated, and which – more than anything else – 
justifies, indeed compels, an analysis of the “performative character” of the work.  
The attempt to synthesise literature and philosophy, to create a theory that is more 
than both but that negates neither, can be viewed as the overarching framework within 
which the theory of Eunomia is presented.  As I shall argue below, the enactment of 
this dialectic in the text has an important effect on the way in which argument is both 
constructed and rendered persuasive; however, the dynamic nature of dialectic also 
means that the greater the level of acceptance of argument, the more plausible and 
successful the attempt to synthesise literature and philosophy itself appears; perhaps 
even more so than usual, as neither the attempted synthesis nor the techniques of 
justification that it engenders are ever explicitly acknowledged.  Both elements are 
                                                 
87 See e.g. Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §5.8. 
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 engaged in a process of mutual reinforcement, all the stronger for remaining 
unspoken; however, if, in being rendered explicit, one is found to be unpersuasive, the 
other will of necessity fall with it.  It is with this in mind that I turn to some of the 
more concrete rhetorical justificatory techniques of Allott’s work. 
 
Language 
One major aspect of the undoubted novelty of Eunomia is Allott’s general use of 
language, both in terms of the style he employs and the tone he adopts; indeed, the 
two are often intimately linked.  One of the first tasks of any reader is to immediately 
acclimatise himself, not merely with an extensive new vocabulary, but also with 
significant reworkings of many more familiar terms.  Moreover, there are distinct 
oddities of style that often render what is already a challenging reading experience 
considerably more so, such as the frequent use of the conjunction “and” in lists of 
terms where the normal conventions of writing would require commas, and, indeed, 
where other punctuation may normally be expected: “The hypothesis of the perennial 
dilemmas of society is intended to discover in the apparently amorphous dialectic of 
social life a regular and symmetrical and systematic pattern shaping the whole course 
of accumulated human social experience”.88  The effect of this is quite particular: it 
affords the reader no respite where he could normally expect some, particularly in the 
midst of such complex sentences, whilst giving the impression that there is a lot that 
must be said, and only limited time and space in which to say it – the reader must 
either be swept up or risk being left behind.  In general it serves to create both a sense 
of movement and of urgency that infuses the text and allows for no pause for thought 
as the prose flows and unsettles and flusters and finally threatens to overwhelm; blink, 
and you might miss it. 
 
More important, however, is the relentless creation of new, and problematisation of 
old, vocabulary throughout the course of the work.  The reader must not only get to 
grips with a wide array of entirely novel terms and expressions – such as, amongst 
many others, “social exchange”,89 90 91 “supersocialisation”  and “unsociety”  – but also 
cope with the fact that the meaning of many more familiar words – such as 
                                                 
88 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §4.12. 
89 See e.g. ibid., at §10.1. 
90 See e.g. ibid., at §12.30. 
91 See e.g. ibid., at §13.105. 
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 “constitution”, “society” and even “law” – is reconstituted and reformulated within 
the context of the theory, sometimes more than once.92  This, like the technique 
referred to above, serves to unsettle the reader: inundated with entirely unfamiliar 
terms, and unfamiliar meanings of familiar terms, compounded by the sense of 
movement and urgency of the prose and the complete absence of any reference to 
which one can anchor oneself, it is easy to feel entirely cast adrift at any number of 
points in the book.  This almost inevitable loss of bearing can wear down even the 
most conscientious of readers, rendering difficult sustained critique of the claims of 
the theory, thus granting them a sort of authority-by-default. 
 
Nor is it simply in terms of individual words and expressions that Allott’s use of 
language can prove difficult: the manner in which these are formulated into prose is 
itself both novel and extremely complex.  As Koskenniemi notes,  
 
…when the reader has finally relinquished all defence, he or she may perhaps be able to feel at 
home with such things as ‘the reality of reality’ and the ‘transcendental philosophy of 
philosophy, the human mind transcending all previous transcending of itself in 
consciousness’…93
 
Allott’s discussion in Eunomia of the conceiving of society in the philosophy of the 
beginning of the modern era provides a stark example of this.  In terms that are really 
quite clear, and invoke the well-known dilemma of constituted and constituting 
power, he notes that early modern theorising on society 
 
…tended to express itself in terms of the problem of the genesis of society and hence of the 
origin of authoritative willing in society, or, put in other words, the problem of the origin, and 
hence the authority, of law in society.  The problem of understanding the becoming of a 
society would be posed as if it were a problem of how a society comes into being... To explain 
                                                 
92 There are, for example, many different definitions of the term “law”, and it is far from obvious that 
they all essentially mean exactly the same thing, or, indeed, that they are all entirely commensurable: 
“law is the continuing structure-system of human socialising” (§ 1.1); “law is idea not fact” (§ 6.70); 
“law is a set of retained acts of will” (§6.77); “law is not a set of rules.  Law is will…Law is a set of 
legal relations” (6.79); “law is the directed self-becoming of society” (§16.4); and lastly, we may also 
add the definition of law implicit in his assertion that “the human animal, like the chimpanzee and the 
termite, is a social animal.  To be a social animal is to be law-abiding” (§14.2) 
93 Koskenniemi, loc. cit. n. 7, at p. 332 (footnotes omitted).  The passages from Allott’s work to which 
Koskenniemi refers here are taken from The Health of Nations (at p. 74 and 99 respectively), but they 
are sufficiently similar in style and content for the point to be valid in the context of Eunomia. 
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 the willing of society expressed in law, it was necessary only to explain the willing of that 
willing.94
 
Allott’s next step, however, is to rephrase this passage “in the terms of the present 
study”, in that “the willing of law under the real constitution was willing by a will 
which had itself been willed under the legal and ideal constitutions.  There remained 
the question of how society’s will is itself willed”.95  The effect of this translation of 
the first passage into the style and tone of the book in general is not, in my view, to 
increase the clarity of the point being made; nor, I suspect, was the second 
formulation chosen for its aesthetic qualities.  Rather, it serves to reinscribe the reader 
into the complex totality of the rhetoric of the work as a whole, again serving to 
challenge and unsettle after a brief and rare period of respite in a more familiar 
linguistic setting. 
 
And this is not the only manner in which Allott seeks to provide authority for his 
claims through the problematisation of language.  As noted above, some terms Allott 
invents; others, he redefines.  Also illuminating, however, is his treatment of (at least 
some of) those terms that he seeks to discard.  This is best brought out in his use of 
the epithet “so-called” at various points throughout the book.  Thus, for example, he 
talks of “so-called international relations”,96 97 “so-called government”,  “so-called 
wars”,98 99 100 “so-called criminals”,  and even the “so-called law of contract”.   In this 
manner, Allott not only emphasises the novelty – sometimes the radical novelty – of 
his own thesis, but also conveys the idea of an unmasking, of a progression somehow 
from deception to truth, of liberation from some façade of false consciousness.  On 
occasion, we are provided with some developed argumentation supporting his reasons 
for doing so (such as those that he makes in support of his claim that the word “war” 
will disappear as a category from international law);101 more often than not, however, 
the epithet is simply introduced without explanation, leaving its suggestive force 
                                                 
94 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §12.52. 
95 Ibid., at §12.53. 
96 Ibid., at §15.39. 
97 Ibid., at §16.76. 
98 Ibid., at §6.21 
99 Ibid., at §16.96. 
100 Ibid., at §17.26.  Other uses of this epithet can be found at §1.15 (“so-called feelings”), §17.82 (“so-
called ideological conflict”) and §10.32 (“so-called rights and duties”), to name but three. 
101 Ibid., at §15.16. On this point, see the section below on the mystification of society in Allott’s work. 
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 entirely to the imagination of the reader.  Allott’s use of language in general, then, 
combines to create an overwhelming sense of complexity, of confusion, and of its 
own inherent superiority in relation to that which it opposes itself; and these 




Central to any examination of the performative force of a work is consideration of the 
authorial voice in which it is expressed, as this can often furnish us with the clearest 
idea of the kind of relation, and more broadly the kind of community, that the rhetor is 
seeking to establish with his audience.102  The considerations of the previous two 
sections, on enacted dialectics and on language, are of immediate relevance in this 
context: Allott writes with the passion of the innovator, and the certainty of one who 
is standing on the shoulders of giants; his work displays both the skill of the artist and 
the seriousness of the philosopher, as he continually undermines the commonplaces, 
the topoi, of standard international legal argumentation with his generation of new 
vocabulary and his attacks on the old.   
 
Koskenniemi has also noted, in this regard, Allott’s frequent use techniques of 
grandeur in the construction of the voice of the work, such as, for example, an almost 
biblical style of expression – particularly where seeking to draw a conclusion – 
through the use of phrases such as “And so it is that”; “a technique that bridges the 
gap between argument and conclusion by drawing upon an obscure association to 
something vaguely religious or deeply philosophical”.103  This in turn conveys the 
impression that perennial truths are being conveyed, unmasked by Allott’s dialectical 
lifting of the veil of false consciousness in which international society, or 
“international unsociety”, is currently cloaked.104  It is in this tone, more than any 
other, that Allott enacts the claim to transcendence that provides the ultimate 
foundation of his thesis, “the transcendental that we recognize in the aesthetic 
appearance of his writing but that finds no real articulation in his argument”.105  And, 
as Carty argues, the “confident tone of the oracle” that runs throughout the book 
                                                 
102 On this point, see e.g. White, op. cit. n. 23, ch. 1. 
103 Koskenniemi, loc. cit. n. 7, p. 332. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid., at p. 339. 
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 leaves the reader with the impression that, in matters in which he disagrees, then “‘the 
fault’ must lie with him”.106   
 
This is an impression that is further engendered by Allott’s frequent habit of 
characterising disagreement on certain key issues as unthinkable; inhuman, even.  
Consider, for example, his passage on religion (broadly understood as the search for 
the transcendental) quoted above.  He begins by noting that religion “is as natural to 
human beings as thinking”, and goes on to state that it is “natural, therefore, that 
reflexive and reflective consciousnesses” will seek the transcendental.107  The 
intention is clear: not only are those who disagree on this fundamental (and essentially 
unargued) assertion engaging in a pointless disagreement with the way things are (the 
appeal to nature), they are also – what is worse – simply not thinking hard enough 
about it.  The same device is used in his expulsion of the possibility of war from his 
ideal theory: “It is hard to imagine that any thoughtful human being could regard war 
as natural”,108 ignoring the fact that many in his “great tradition” of philosophy, 
including, for example, Hegel, did precisely this.109  These acts of excommunication, 
and others like them, are, as always, presented as simple, uncontroversial, self-evident 
truths to which all rational, moral humans will naturally consent; indeed, one of the 
most surprising features of the book in general, as a work of speculative utopian 
philosophy, is the almost complete absence of the conditional mood.110
 
The reader, then, is dazzled, unsettled and intimidated by the scope of Allott’s theory, 
the bewildering complexity and novelty of its formulations, and the severe 
authoritarianism of its tone.  And it is in this that we might first begin to question the 
success of Allott’s attempted synthesis between the many-voicedness of literature and 
the search for philosophical truth, for it is not the irreducible conflict of the perennial 
dilemmas but rather the transcendental voice of History, Reason and Nature that is 
                                                 
106 Carty, loc. cit. n. 5, p. 939. 
107 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §6.19; see also supra n. 42. 
108 Ibid., at §15.10. 
109 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, op. cit. n. 52, at p. 210: “the ethical health of peoples is preserved 
in their indifference to the stabilization of finite institutions; just as the blowing of winds preserves the 
sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so also corruption in nations 
would be the product of prolonged, let alone ‘perpetual’, peace”.  
110 There are one or two points in the book at which the conditional mood is used; see e.g. Allott, op. 
cit. n. 6, at §15.82, when he discusses the “disappearing” of the theoretical notion of authority.  Such 
moments, however, are rare indeed; and, in their scarcity, serve only to underline the certainty with 
which the rest of his pronouncements are intoned. 
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 111enacted, and ultimately prevails, in the rhetoric of the book.   And while, in the 
early stages of the work, this means that there is a certain discord between the surface 
meaning of the text and the enacted meaning of the language and style, it is, as I shall 
argue below, gradually worked out as the vocabulary of conflict is steadily usurped, 
and ultimately completely replaced, by that of integration, reconciliation, and 
systemic completion.  The performative effect of the voice of Eunomia is thus not to 
encourage the reader to “join in” in the imaginative creation of a new vision of global 
society; rather, it requires only that he submit to Allott’s vision or risk expulsion from 
the community of rational, thoughtful humanity.  It risks appearing as a voice 
intended not to elicit the active participation of the reader, but rather to dominate him.  
In this way, to the critical reader at least, the “utopian” element of the book begins to 
function as more of a threat than a promise. 
 
Metaphor 
One of the central ways in which Allott supports this voice, and through this seeks to 
create authority for his move from the essentially conflictual understanding of the 
constituting of society towards one of dialectical progression and transcendental 
resolution, is through the construction of certain metaphors, establishing 
equivalencies that then assume central roles as topoi from which the argumentative 
progression of the theory is based.  Broadly speaking, there are two main sets of 
these: the mechanistic and the organic.  To my mind, although often expressed in the 
same paragraph (and even sometimes in the same sentence), and often bolstered by 
cross-application to each other, they serve two quite distinct, albeit related, purposes: 
the function of the former is to create and justify the expectation of society as a neatly 
functioning, self-contained and internally-coherent totality (at least in its ideal 
construction); whereas that of the latter is to provide authority for the technique, 
crucial to the argumentative platform of the entire work, of the personification of 
society, and to render the claims to natural progression, to an evolution of society, less 
jarring and thus more acceptable.  It is also worth noting at the outset, however, that 
both are powerfully holistic, unifying images that make render it difficult to think of 
society as a whole as anything other than an essentially discrete and (ideally, at least) 
functioning unit. 
 
                                                 
111 On this, see Koskenniemi, loc. cit. n. 7, at p. 333. 
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 One of the first, and most frequently recurring, examples of the mechanistic metaphor 
is provided by Allott’s dual definition of society (and many of its component parts, 
such as law) as a “structure-system”.112  This term is meant to encapsulate society 
both as a unified and discrete entity (a structure) and also as something that is 
dynamic, fluid, constantly developing through the operation of its “generic principles” 
(a system) (and thus providing us with another example of an enacted dialectic in his 
work, this time between the static and the changing, or between space and time).113  
In doing so, he appears to be working with a definition capable of encompassing all 
aspects of society, its capacity to develop – sometimes in a revolutionary manner – 
whilst remaining recognisably the same in another sense.  The inclusiveness of this 
definition is further bolstered by its familiarity: although unusual when coupled 
together as one term of art, there is nothing in the least odd about referring to society 
as either a structure or a system; indeed, both terms are so commonly applied in this 
manner as to be regularly accepted without further thought.  Rhetorically speaking, 
however, neither word is as neutral or as devoid of substantive implication as we 
might suspect. 
 
The situation in which metaphorical uses of words become so common as to be 
viewed as literal is one form of catachresis, commonly found, for example, in such 
figures of speech as the “mouth of the river”, the “foot of the hill” or the “hands of a 
clock”.  In everyday expressions such as these, there is relatively little at stake, and so 
the literalisation of metaphor may be allowed to pass without comment.  In works of 
philosophy, on the other hand, such usage may have direct consequences for the 
development of the theory, and thus must be examined closely.  Perelman makes this 
point in relation to the Cartesian method of philosophical enquiry: using the 
catachresis of a “chain of reasoning”, Descartes insisted that any argument was only 
as strong as its weakest link, and from there constructed his basic methodology of 
working back from any proposition, testing each stage in its argumentative 
construction, and invalidating any claim that was not compelled, directly and 
analytically, from indubitable premises.  Perelman points out that, had Descartes 
                                                 
112 This is the definition of law with which the book opens: Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §1.1. 
113 It is true that Allott states that society “is not a thing but a process” (ibid., at §3.1; see Nicholas 
Onuf, “The Constitution of International Society”, 5 European Journal of International Law (1994) 1-
19, at p. 1).  This, however, is best viewed as an attempt to avoid the reification of society, and not as a 
denial of the often relatively stable nature of its identity, continuing through time. 
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 conceived of the structure of argumentation rather like that of a piece of cloth, woven 
from many different individual strands but significantly stronger as a whole than any 
of them individually, his philosophy might have looked quite different.114
 
The metaphors of “structure” and “system”, so commonly applied to the theory of 
society as to now appear quite literal and uncontroversial, function in the same 
manner in Allott’s work: they serve to draw our attention to certain possibilities and 
away from others, and generate particular expectations in our minds of his 
conclusions.  The most obvious example is that both immediately call to mind the 
nature and workings of machines, functioning within a set framework according to a 
particular set of rules.  Both also connote a sense of neatness, of transaction-without-
remainder, of overall coherence within their own boundaries.  It is thus a relatively 
small, and easily acceptable, rhetorical step from the fairly banal and uncontroversial 
claim that society is a “structure-system” to the much stronger, and eminently 
contestable, assertion that society is “a totality, an integrated structure, a self-coherent 
system”,115 guided, in ideal form at least, by a uniform set of operating principles.  
And when society does not work like this, it is not a problem with the theory, or with 
the basic idea that it can and should: it is viewed, quite literally, as a malfunction: 
“Machines break down.  Living things suffer disease, decay, and death.  Any structure 
may fall apart.  Any system may work badly or fail… To do well, in and through 
society, is a human potentiality.  To do badly, in and through society, is an all-too-
human possibility”.116
 
The support that these mechanistic metaphors, and many others like them throughout 
the work, provides to the fundamental claim of the possibility of transcendence of 
conflict and dilemma should be clear: society, in its utopian existence, is a machine; 
as such, it’s operating principle must be that of systemic completion, of the parts 
functioning together to create something more than themselves without themselves 
                                                 
114 Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1982), p. 122.  This 
example, although illuminating, should not be overstated in the context of Descartes’ work: it is 
possible that it was his philosophical project, of gaining incontrovertibly “true” human knowledge, that 
led him to adopt the metaphor of a “chain” of reasoning, and not vice versa.  The example, however, 
serves well to illustrate the point; and the objection above is not applicable to the argument of this 
section in that here we are concerned with the rhetorical construction of authority claims in Allott’s 
work, and not with his particular choice of methodology. 
115 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §9.30. 
116 Ibid., at §12.3. 
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 being negated or destroyed in the process.  The ideal of the machine must function, 
and function cleanly and neatly – however imperfect, however messy, it always 
appears to be in practice.  The parts of the machine may be in apparent conflict with 
each other individually, but they combine to produce, ultimately and ideally, the 
desired result. 
 
There are innumerable examples of such mechanistic metaphors in Allott’s work, 
which are often supported by overtly scientific ones – each serving to support the 
credibility of the others by their constant invocation.   Think, for example of his early 
definition of the basic concept of imagination: it “generates connections within the 
contents of our minds, making available to us a series of connections from among the 
infinity of possible connections, establishing electrochemical pathways connecting 
mental contents of all kinds”,117 or the role that he ascribes to “the constant of 
supersocialization”.118  It is also interesting to note the role that Allott’s use of figures 
plays in establishing the equivalencies constructed by the repetitive use of metaphor: 
almost all portray key terms in something very similar to a flow chart, with each 
existing in a binary (if sometimes dynamic) relation to one other key concept;119 
again, the effect is to create an impression of neatness, of effective functioning-
according-to-principle, of machine-like order and efficiency.  Most striking, in this 
regard, is the figure detailing the social exchange (itself a decidedly mechanistic idea 
as presented in the book): it is actually portrayed in the form of an equation.120
 
The second, related set of metaphorical equivalencies that Allott constructs to support 
his conclusions are organic, as can be seen from the quote above on “machines 
breaking down”: “living things suffer disease, decay, and death”.  The repeated 
assertion of the symmetry between the natural world and the social world, and of that 
between society and the individual, represents for me one of the key justificatory 
techniques upon which the argumentative platform of the whole theory is based.  It 
creates two different sets of effects: the first is that, in a manner very similar to the 
mechanistic metaphors, it allows us to accept the idea of society as a discrete entity, 
                                                 
117 Ibid., at §1.14. 
118 Ibid., at §12.32. 
119 See e.g. ibid., at §3.26. 
120 Ibid., at §10.19. 
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 as unity; the second is to lend support to the overtly naturalistic claims that he makes 
towards the end of the work. 
 
The first is exemplified by Allott’s suggestion that the reality of society mirrors that 
of the individual (which is again, in turn, supported by the unstated underlying 
philosophical claim that the structure of the universe is repeated in its constituent 
elements).  This technique is most evident in his discussion of the constitution of 
society, leading up to his postulation of the functioning of the social exchange: 
 
An individual human being has a personality.  A society has a constitution.  The 
constitution is for society what personality is for the human individual – the unique 
structure system which confers a unique present-here-and-now on a unique individual 
enabling that individual to make a future from the past, a past from the future, 
possibilities from actualities, actualities from possibilities.121
 
This passage is of crucial importance to the argument that he advances, for it is this 
that allows him to slip from the banal and uncontroversial notion that individual 
human beings have purposes and interests directly to the much less evident claim that 
societies can also be unproblematically understood as possessing these in essentially 
the same manner.  The importance of that assertion to the social exchange cannot be 
overstated: after all, it is in exchanging natural power social power (that is, by 
dedicating it to social purposes) that the legal relation, which alone has the ability to 
universalise the interests of the individual in society and individualise those of society 
in the individual, is created.  It is only once such a move has been made that the 
reader can be asked to acquiesce to such statements as “in law, society remembers 
what it has decided to become”.122  Here, it seems clear that Allott is depending upon 
                                                 
121 Ibid., at §9.2.  Another strong statement along the same lines can be found in §4.37.  It is worth 
noting that here, again, Allott makes use of an argument that may be familiar to many from the 
previous works of major thinkers, without making explicit reference thereto; in the case, Freud.  In 
Civilization and its Discontents (London: Penguin Books, 2004; first published, 1930), Freud argues 
that “… if we focus our attention on the relation between the civilization of mankind and the 
development or upbringing of the individual, we shall conclude, without much hesitation, that the two 
processes are very similar in kind, if not indeed one and the same process, as it affects different kinds 
of object” (p. 98).  Yet even the very vague, diffuse sort of authority that this echo imparts to Allott’s 
claim should not go unchallenged; if, indeed, it is making unspoken reference to Freud, Allott’s claims 
are premised upon a very different basic theory to that used by the psychoanalyst (itself the subject of 
much controversy).  Moreover, Freud himself counsels caution, noting that in this regard “the search 
for analogies should not be pursued to excess” (pp. 98-99). 
122 Allott, loc. cit. n. 19, at p. 224. 
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 123a (con)fusion of the ideas of analogy and metaphor for the force of his argument.   
Certainly, both are used to construct equivalencies between the objects thus related; 
however, the former, once accepted, can be used in quasi-formal argumentation to 
make authoritative statements about the second term in function of its relation to the 
first; the latter, on the other hand, is a much more literary device, used to create an 
image in the mind of the reader – not to allow him to draw a particular set of fixed 
conclusions.  This distinction is perhaps best drawn out by using the two terms in 
conjunction with “reasoning”: analogous reasoning has long been accepted as a valid 
mode of syllogistic progression by all but the most strict of logicians; “metaphorical 
reasoning” clearly has not (hence the need for the inverted commas).  In this case, 
while we can happily accept the idea that a constitution is a society’s personality is a 
potentially illuminating metaphor for some situations, it is, to my mind at least, much 
harder to accept it as an analogy – that is, as an equivalency upon which a process of 
quasi-logical reasoning can be based.  Allott, although never explicitly, draws heavily 
on this metaphor in asserting that societies have discrete minds, consciousnesses 
capable of generating purposes and interests.  In doing so, he elides the distinction 
between metaphor and analogy, treating the latter as the former; naturally, the literary 
style of the whole book makes this elision much less evident, and much less 
controversial, than it would otherwise appear.124
 
A related, but still more problematic, technique is used by Allott in order to create an 
equivalence between society and the physical world.  We first encounter this in his 
discussion of the conceptual couplets impulse of life and necessity (which belong to 
the realm of the physical world) and desire and obligation, which he presents as their 
counterparts in consciousness: “Obligation is necessity which consciousness makes 
for itself, from within itself, to enable it to act as a system”.125 Just as the impulse of 
life and necessity combine to produce cause and effect, so their counterparts in the 
                                                 
123 It is true that Perelman (op. cit. n. 109, p. 120) insists that metaphor is merely a truncated analogy; 
however, he is, to my mind, a little dogmatic in this, ignoring the fact that, generally speaking, while 
one is acceptable in most types of philosophy, the other is “confined” to the realm of literature. 
124 Interestingly, at one point Allott notes that there is no necessary correlation between the personality 
of an individual and the constitution of society, but that this is how we have come to conceive of the 
issue: “What might have been merely a metaphor or a theoretical construct has become the most 
substantial of realities.  Societies have acquired within consciousness the personalities of individual 
human beings”. (Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §4.30).  However, the effect of the metaphors that he constructs 
in the course of the book is to naturalise, we might even say essentialise, that very conception. 
125 Ibid., at §3.17. 
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 realm of consciousness, desire and obligation, combine to produce human willing and 
acting.126  Allott then represents these progressions in a figure in the basic flow chart 
form: the two processes, then, are kept entirely separate, and yet placed side by side.  
In this way, he is able to create a powerful impression in the mind of the reader of the 
essential symmetry, identity even, of the structures of the physical world and those of 
consciousness.127
 
Allott further bolsters the structural equivalencies engendered by these metaphors by 
conflating them.  Consider, for example, this comment on the “generic principles” of 
the constitution: “they are the principles which, like the operating principles of a 
living thing or of an organic system or a material system or of a machine, systematize 
the interacting of the sub-systems of society’s constitutional structure”.128 Or the 
following passage, which bears a strong resemblance to the one above on the 
symmetry of individual and societal consciousness, but differs from it in one crucial 
respect: 
 
A person and a society are also one and many in another sense.  Each is a multiple unity.  The 
component parts are systems of component parts.  A person is a system which integrates 
subordinate physiological systems and it integrates those sub-systems within the system of 
consciousness.  A society is a system which integrates both its own subordinate systems (for 
example, decision-making bodies) and the systems of systems which are individual 
persons.129
 
Again here we can quite clearly see both the mechanistic metaphor and the attempt to 
establish a sense of structural identity between the society and the individual; this 
time, however, it is not the reality-for-itself of consciousness of each that is equated, 
but rather the sub-systems of society (e.g. decision-making bodies) and the 
physiological systems of humanity.  Thus, not only do we have the insinuation of a 
symmetrical relationship between societal and individual consciousness, but also 
between the constructions of the social world and the physical reality of the natural 
                                                 
126 Ibid., at §3.11-§3.18. 
127 A similar technique to this is used in his discussion of the justification of the generic principles of a 
constitution, when he discusses the validity of scientific propositions in one paragraph (§11.9) and then 
suggests a structurally identical argument for his proposed principles (§11.10).  See supra, n. 65 and 
accompanying text. 
128 Ibid., at §11.4. 
129 Ibid., at §4.25. 
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 world.  Without ever actually explicitly claiming so, Allott implies an identity 
between the physiology of human beings (conceived of as the totality of necessity of 
our functioning) and the socionomy of society (“a totality of obligation in the social 
consciousness of that society”).  This is a move of some importance in the context of 
the claims of the latter stages of the work, as Allott begins more and more to 
introduce an idea of natural and necessary progress into the theory of society; evident 
already in his notion that international society has misconceived itself as 
“unsociety”130 (a surprising notion, which seems to compel the idea that international 
society somehow is other than it is conceived to be) it is made explicit most clearly in 
passages such as the following, for which only the careful construction of metaphor – 
of both sets discussed in this section – could prepare the reader, particularly without 
the support of more overt forms of authority: 
 
However, from the vantage point of the end of the twentieth century, it is possible to perceive 
the activity of international society in the last five centuries, especially its activity in the 
twentieth century, as the pre-natal ordering of a society which was yet to be born into the 
world of its own consciousness, as the unselfconscious self-socializing of a society which did 
not yet know itself as a society.  It is possible to say, with the benefit of hindsight and 
hypothesis, that international society has been ordering itself in spite of itself.  International 
society has been not merely a self-misconceived unsociety but a presociety instinctively or 
spontaneously seeking to become a society.131
 
In this passage, we can see the culminative effect of many of the various different 
aspects of the rhetoric of Eunomia that I have been discussing here: the characteristic 
novelty and complexity of the prose, the privileged voice of History, and the 
personification of society and its natural and inevitable progression.  Again, in the 
absence of these, the only appeal to authority that Allott makes is to the self-evidence 
of his assertions; by this stage, however, the reader is either “in” or “out” – and this 
will depend almost entirely upon his reaction to the rhetorics of the piece.  In 
particular, one who has accepted the mechanistic and organic metaphors that Allott 
uses to construct the structural equivalencies upon which much of the passage just 
quoted relies will see nothing particularly odd or objectionable in it; those who have 
not, however, are more likely to react with profound skepticism to his claims.  Both 
                                                 
130 See generally ibid., ch. 13. 
131 Ibid., at §15.8. 
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 the overriding sense of systemic completion and that of the natural development of 
society as a discrete individual, then, are engendered through the metaphors used and 
the repeated assertion of structural equivalencies.  Rejection of these, at least as a 
persuasive basis for a process of analogous reasoning, is very likely to lead us to deep 
suspicion, if not outright rejection, of the conclusions that he reaches. 
 
Technique 
I want to conclude this section by having a brief look at some of the other rhetorical 
devices that Allott employs in order to provide his claims with a sense of authority 
that finds little or no elaboration in the explicit argument of the text.  Again, 
Koskenniemi’s analysis of some of these is illuminating, particularly in the context of 
the sense of grandeur that is created by repeated use of the technique of anaphora (the 
repetition of the same word or phrase at the beginning of successive sentences),132 
and Allott’s frequent justificatory incantation of what Perelman refers to as “universal 
values” – values whose desirability is part of the definition of the term itself – such as 
“happiness”, “well-being” and “prosperity”,133 without going into the necessarily 
messy and controversial business of specifying their meaning in any further detail.  
Also interesting in this regard is Allott’s fairly frequent habit of reinforcing the sense 
of all-encompassing completion that pervades his work by use of abnormally long 
lists of examples, often starting with the smallest and ending with the largest of the 
object of concern;134 he does not intend these lists to be exhaustive, and the basic 
point could be made with a much lower number of exemplars equally clearly; perhaps 
not, however, equally effectively.  Or we might consider again the use of numbered 
paragraphs, and the manner in which they impart a sense not simply of structure but 
also of logical progression that in their absence would often be simply lacking. 
However, of all the various techniques that he employs in the constitution of authority 
in his work, two strike me as being particularly noteworthy. 
 
The first is his regular habit of postulating something as true, then inverting the 
subject/ predicate relation of the claim and asserting that as true also: “By education 
society takes power over our consciousness.  By education we take power over 
                                                 
132 See e.g. ibid., at §14.5, where Allott repeatedly begins sentences with the words “Law is…”.  
Koskenniemi refers to this as “staccato”; see Koskenniemi, loc. cit. n. 7, at p. 331. 
133 Ibid. 
134 See e.g. Allott, op. cit. n. 6., at §3.37, §5.50. 
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 society’s consciousness.  Knowledge takes power over consciousness.  Consciousness 
takes power over knowledge.”135  Or he constructs complex compound predicates, 
and reverses the terms of these: “Law is the socialization of particular desire, the 
particularization of social desire.  Law is the socialization of particular obligation, the 
particularization of social obligation.”136  What is enacted in the rhetoric of these 
apparently conflicting constructions is, once again, the dialectical spirit that is 
characteristic of the book as a whole: by asserting one followed immediately by its 
inversion, we get a sense not of aporia but rather of circularity, and of the systemic 
completion and closure that this implies.  Despite Allott’s protestations to the 
contrary, this is not the rhetoric of revolution, but rather of resolution. 
 
The second may be termed his enallage of time.  Enallage is the substitution of one 
part of speech for a different one, usually to create an emphatic effect: Perelman uses 
the example, in terms of time, of “if you speak, you are dead”.137  Here, the 
(grammatically correct) future tense is dropped, and replaced with the present: the 
consequence is a sense of immediacy, of urgency, of making the threat (or the 
promise) of the future more real.  I have already noted the surprising lack of the 
conditional mood in the book; perhaps even more striking, however, is the fact that it 
is written almost entirely in the present tense.  This is an example of enallage of time 
writ large: Allott’s analysis and critique of the present circumstances of international 
society and his prescriptions for how things should work are both thus imbued with a 
sense of actuality, of reality that framing the latter in the future tense would simply 
not convey.  For example, during a lengthy and powerful critique of the failings of 
international society, entirely misconceived – and hence woefully malfunctioning – as 
international unsociety, Allott notes that 
 
Lacking a total social process, interstatal unsociety could not be socialized in the name of 
justice.  The power used externally by the state-societies is not conceived as social power, 
because there is no conception of a society to delegate it as a social power.  It is conceived of 
as natural, unsocialized power, energy applied for a purpose.138
 
                                                 
135 Ibid., at §3.5. 
136 Ibid., at §14.5. 
137 Perelman, op. cit. n. 109, at p. 38. 
138 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §13.105. 
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 However, despite this acknowledgement, he later goes on to insist that 
 
every single legal relation in which any society of any kind, including a state-society, 
participates, or in which any individual human participates, is a relation created by delegation 
from international society.  This is true of every legal relation from a power-right to make law 
for the whole world to a power-right to cause the installation of a particular traffic-light at a 
particular road-junction.   139
 
Of course, it is difficult to see how, if Allott’s diagnosis of the current state of 
international society is accepted at all (and to me it is in his diagnostic voice that he is 
at his most convincing), all legal relations everywhere can be in any meaningful sense 
delegated from that society.  It seems clear that, in one passage, he is speaking in 
terms of practical reality, whilst in the other it is the voice of ideal theory that is 
heard.  This refusal to use the future tense is also effective in creating and inscribing 
the reader within an overall progress narrative: often, Allott will begin with an 
unremittingly grim view of the world as it is, then move to an expression of his pure 
theory, and only then begin to consider some of the “advances” that have been made 
during the twentieth century, all in the present tense.  The postulation of the antithesis 
of the ideal followed immediately by the ideal itself acts to lend credence to the idea 
that certain developments, such as, for example, the advent of human rights,140 are 
quite simply a development in the natural progression from one extreme to the other, 
as seen from the privileged “vantage point”141 that is (or was) the end of the twentieth 
century.  By framing the argument of the book in this manner, Allott thus makes it 
appear entirely plausible that “that humanity is passing through what is presumably a 
transitional period in which the international public realm is forming itself”,142 as it 
moves from self-misconception and malfunction towards the ideal telos of the pure 
theory of Eunomia. 
 
The Mystification of Society 
The rhetorics of Allott’s work thus combine to create certain expectations, a certain 
credulity even, on the part of the reader, to draw his attention towards certain 
                                                 
139 Ibid., at §16.33. 
140 See e.g. ibid., at §15.62. 
141 This is an idea that Allott appeals to frequently; see e.g. §15.8, §15.44, §15.56, and §19.17, amongst 
others. 
142 Ibid., at §15.59. 
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 possibilities and to blinker him to others.  In particular, arguments based upon a 
notion of equivalence between a society and an individual, between a society and a 
machine, and between the functioning of social reality and that of physical reality are 
all given a prima facie respectability and plausibility that they simply would not enjoy 
without the complex and involved construction of metaphor and analogy, whilst the 
intricacies and novelty of the language, combined with the assured and often severe 
authority of the voice, serve to further bolster this.  The centrepiece of the theory, the 
“generic principles” of the constitutions of all societies – from families to sports 
teams, local businesses to multilateral corporations, international organizations to 
states and finally to the global society of the whole human race – receives, as I argued 
above, very little in the way of persuasive justification in the normal sense of 
academic writing.  Instead, it relies for its authority on that which is enacted in the 
rhetorics of the piece.  The argument that I want to advance in this section is that these 
principles are then relied on by Allott as he moves his pure theory towards what we 
may properly term as a “mystification” of society in general, and international society 
in particular. 
 
This mystification proceeds, broadly speaking, in three main steps.  The first is the 
elision of conflict; the gradual abandoning of the aporia as expressed in the early 
stages of the work, most notably in the context of the irreducible and irredeemable 
perennial dilemmas, in favour of a spirit of integration, reconciliation, and dialectical 
transcendence: 
 
… law is necessarily in the social interest.  This is a consequence of the fact that the law is a 
means of the systematic self-ordering of society, as it applies its purposes to transform natural 
power into social power… [this] is a consequence of the fact that, within a society, an 
individual member and the society do not have intrinsically conflicting interests.  Each forms 
and is formed by the other.  Each gives and receives value from the other.  The individual 
member of society is the society individualized.  The society is the individual socialized.  Law 
embodies this transformation.143
 
                                                 
143 Ibid., at §11.28. 
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 Thus it is not the function of law to reconcile intrinsically conflicting interests.  Law is an 
expression of the self-interest of all members of society in the survival and prospering of the 
society and the self-interest of the society in the survival and prospering of its members.144
 
The dialectical method, which also gains authority for its introduction through the 
rhetorical enactments of the book rather than through more conventional forms of 
argumentation, at this point becomes itself alone the authority for the shift in focus 
from the conflict of the perennial dilemmas to their resolution in the ideal society.  In 
law, society can transcend conflict between itself and its members and, by 
universalising the particular interests of the latter, presumably also those between the 
individual members themselves.  The perennial dilemmas still exist, still drive the 
becoming of society; now, however, they are contained within the overall framework 
of that society, as a properly-functioning machine and as a healthy organism.  At this 
point, however, the system is not yet closed; the possibility of ethical resistance to law 
itself remains open. 
 
The second step, then, is the fetishisation of law, the closing of the escape route away 
from the results of the functioning of the “total social process” and back into the 
aporia and contradiction of the dilemmas.  This fetishisation is most evident in 
Allott’s discussion, and exclusion, of the notion of illegal physical force as a viable 
ethical option: 
 
Law transforms natural power into social power by means of legal relations which determine 
when and how natural power may be used for a social purpose, by whom and in relation to 
whom.  Physical force is not some natural residual power available to any society-member, 
unsocialized but socially accepted, to be used at will, even if only in the last resort.145
 
In society the last resort is law and legal power.  To consecrate the use of physical force by 
making of it some general theoretical category of social and legal power is to consecrate anti-
social behaviour.146
 
Not only, then, does law transcend conflict; it also, in the final instance, disposes of it.  
Any resistance to law must take place “to the extent that law itself so allows”.147  
                                                 
144 Ibid., at §11.30. 
145 Ibid., at §15.18. 
146 Ibid., at §15.19. 
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 Thus Allott comes to exclude exclusion itself through the mechanism of law: 
ultimately, the limits of morality and the limits of law reveal themselves, within this 
model, as coextensive.  It seems clear that any attempt to finally contain the 
particularity of the ethical decision within a framework of general rules, be they moral 
or legal, procedural or substantive, automatically and of necessity brings us back 
within the “modern problematic”; and, from the standpoint of the critical challenge, 
such a claim can only be based in the final instance upon a fetishisation of law 
itself.148  It is not to overstate the matter to say that, within the terms of that challenge, 
it is only if we keep the possibility of illegal force, violence and ultimately war alive 
that we can have a genuinely ethical approach to our laws.  It is only if we remain 
able to make sense of the notion of “ethical but illegal” (or, indeed, “unethical but 
legal”) that any sort of response to the critical challenge, as I have sketched it here, 
can even begin to be articulated. 
 
One objection may be raised here: that Allott’s theory is an ideal theory; where 
society is malfunctioning, then the possibility of illegal resistance is once again 
activated.  Certainly, Allott’s enallage of time, his habit of speaking always in the 
present tense regardless of whether he is in his diagnostic or normative mode, lends 
some support to this possibility; however, it must, in my view, be rejected.  Firstly, 
because it is abundantly clear from Allott’s description of international unsociety that 
he views it as currently functioning very badly indeed; and yet it is equally evident 
from his polemic on the subject of war that he in no circumstances views it as an 
acceptable ethical choice.149  Secondly, Allott openly concedes that his utopianism is 
practically unattainable, that it will always be out of reach, that society “will never be 
what it might be”;150 this being so, all actual societies malfunction to a degree.  If his 
exclusion of non-legal violence were to be limited only to an admittedly unachievable 
state of utopia, it would lose all of its force as a principle upon which willing and 
                                                                                                                                            
147 Ibid., at §11.27. 
148 I am using the term “fetishism” here in the classic sense given to it by Marx, in his famous passage 
on “commodity fetishism” from his Capital in which “…a definite social relation between men, that 
assumes…the fantastic form of a relation between things”; broadly speaking, whenever a man-made 
relation, such as law, becomes first reified and then comes to dominate absolutely its creator.  See Karl 
Marx, Capital (London: Penguin Books, 1976) p. 165.   More particularly, in this context here, I am 
using it to refer to the process by which law itself comes to be understood as providing an absolute and 
unchallengeable boundary to moral action. 
149 See e.g. ibid., at §15.10. 
150 Ibid., at §5.47. 
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 acting should be based, leaving Allott’s ideal theory wide open to the kind of criticism 
expressed so caustically by Kenneth Burke: “…once you postulate human virtue as 
the foundation of a system, you are a dullard indeed if you can’t make up a thousand 
schemes for a good society”.151  The incredible imaginative structures of Eunomia are 
anything but the work of a dullard; however, if Allott’s conclusions in this regard are 
to be held valid only in terms of ideal theory, then the basic thrust of the critique still 
finds its mark. 
 
The final step is the mystification of society itself.  This is implicit in a number of 
themes that run through the book: the notion of a self-misconceived unsociety; the 
progress narrative that suggests a “spontaneous” and unselfconscious departure along 
the road marked telos;152 the argument that twentieth-century developments should be 
viewed as “outward signs of this natural and inevitable self-reconceiving of 
international society and its law”153 – all seem to point, in the final analysis, to the 
postulation of a conception of society that is somehow external to, and ultimately 
unconditioned by, human consciousness, individual or social, whatever its state at any 
given point in time.  For me, however, it is given its full and explicit formulation in 
the following passage, worth quoting at some length: 
 
In a self-misconceived international society, in which there is no conception of an 
international social process or international reality and reality-forming, in which there is no 
conception of an international constitution, and in which there is no international public realm 
but only the interacting of a number of individual public realms, there can be no conception of 
the supremacy of law.  There is nothing transcendent into which law can be integrated, no 
transcendent structure-system, no transcending structures of theory and value.  And where 
there is no conception of the supremacy of law, there can be no adequate conception of the 
reality of non-law, including especially morality.  When law has no established place in the 
systematic relationship between individual and social consciousness, morality cannot find an 
established place in the systematic relationship between individual consciousness and the 
reality of all-that-is.  The misconceived international society is a desert in which neither 
international law nor morality can take root and flourish.154
                                                 
151 Burke, Counter-Statement, op. cit. n. 71, at p. 114. 
152 See e.g. supra, n. 125 and accompanying text; see also §16.78, in which Allott claims that “[n]ot 
knowing itself as society, international society has not been able to see, or else to understand, that it is 
following the same course of development” as those state-societies that have turned away from 
sovereignty, first to democracy and then to social justice. 
153 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §16.79. 
154 Ibid., at §16.53. 
 44
   
What is most extraordinary about the above passage is its apparent claim that it is the 
failure of international society to conceive of itself qua society, and thus to structure 
its functioning along the lines of the generic principles of the constitution,155 that has 
caused the failure to develop satisfactory law and hindered the creation of a 
transcendental global morality; there is absolutely no sense that, to the contrary, it is a 
shared sense of morality that allows for an advanced legal framework (of course, 
these two are mutually constitutive to an extent) – and that it is the combined 
existence of these that allows us to talk of the construct-in-consciousness that is 
society.  This also comes through strongly in his discussion of the adoption of the 
Vattelian model as the paradigm for international legal relations: he laments that 
international society did not instead choose an approach based on the theories of 
Rousseau or Kant, that it has not “had its 1789 or 1917”.156  Again, there is no sense 
that international society – such as it was and is – lacked the basic prerequisites to 
make such a choice; and this despite the fact that Kant himself explicitly rejected the 
kind of single global society thesis that Allott is proposing, preferring instead a 
“league” of republican nations.  It is in this sense, then, that we might recall the terms 
of Marx’s powerful critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, in which he made 
precisely the same allegation of mystification: ultimately, in Allott’s pure theory of 
society, as in Hegel’s of the state, “... the conditions are put forward as what is 
conditioned, what determines as what is determined, the producer as the product of its 
product”.157
 
Eunomia, Philosophy, Literature 
I want to begin this short concluding section by way of a disclaimer.  I am aware that 
this examination of Allott’s remarkable theory has been overwhelmingly critical in 
character; that it has glossed over or simply ignored the many and varied qualities that 
it possesses.  That it does possess such qualities, I would certainly not deny; it is an 
extremely impressive work of imagination, with some wonderful formulations of new 
                                                 
155 See e.g. ibid., at §20.24: “Failing to recognize itself as a society, international society has not known 
that it has a constitution.  Not knowing its own constitution, it has ignored the generic principles of a 
constitution”. 
156 Ibid., at §13.107. 
157 Karl Marx, “From the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1843)” in Joseph O’Malley, ed., 
Marx: Early Political Writings (1994) 1-27, at p. 3. 
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 problem sets and reformulations of old.  The work is, for me, particularly powerful in 
its diagnostic mode – perhaps because this is the area in which the claims to self-
evidence upon which it relies are empirically and experientially testable and hence 
more readily acceptable.  There can be no doubt that, in his critique of the current 
state of international society, Allott makes an extremely insightful and important 
contribution to the field, and that his constant and innovative reconstitution of the 
language in which we think about such problems has created some potentially fruitful 
avenues for dealing and living with them.  Undoubtedly, then, it is possible to read it 
in a certain sense much more generously than I have here, as an innovative and 
potentially very fruitful redescription of international society and its law – indeed, 
Koskenniemi himself hints at just such a reading when he refers to it, in a formulation 
echoing Rorty, as “therapeutic”.158  My goal here, however, has been to focus on only 
one aspect of the work, albeit a fundamental one.  In the course of the book, Allott 
reaches a number of very strong, philosophical conclusions; and my aim has been to 
examine how he constructs the authority for the truth claims he makes, particularly in 
his normative, utopian voice; and to use this analysis to evaluate his work in the light 
of the critical challenge that I sketched at the outset.  In short, the question that has 
driven the analysis in this paper has been: Is Eunomia a compelling response to the 
critical challenge to international law, as I have framed it in these pages?  And, if not, 
why not? 
 
As should be clear by now, my answer to the first of these questions is in the negative.  
As I have shown in the preceding sections, Allott’s work relies upon its literary 
element – its imaginative rhetorics, broadly understood – in order to render plausible 
and acceptable a particular set of peculiarly philosophical claims.  In its basic 
dialectical method, in its attempt to exclude exclusion through the transcendental 
potential of the law, it seeks to use literary techniques to justify that which 
philosophical argumentation has until now been unable to: the creation of a 
persuasive, general normative theory that can provide us with universal and acultural 
rules upon which we must base our willing and acting.  In particular, in his 
fetishisation of law and his mystification of society, which together combine to trump 
the conflict and aporia of the perennial dilemmas, he abandons the literary paradigm 
                                                 
158 See Koskenniemi, loc. cit. n. 7; for Rorty on “therapeutic” philosophy, see e.g. Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) at xiii. 
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 in favour of something much more modern.  It is in this sense, I think, that we can 
best understand Koskenniemi’s claim that Allott “is not really a challenger but a 
continuer of a tradition that always sought new ways to articulate the basis for a 
universal law”.159
 
It is also important to add, I think, that his project, implicit yet also evident throughout 
the work, of synthesising philosophy and literature did not succeed.  In the end, the 
many-voicedness of the literary paradigm, the irredeemable conflict and tension that 
this implies, is utterly usurped by the dialectical method of the book.  The ultimate 
themes of reconciliation and transcendence, the authoritarian voice,160 the general 
universality of the conclusions – all point to the search for Truth, not an attempt to 
live with truths; and this belies the apparently literary nature of the prose in which the 
argumentation and justification is constructed.  Allott himself has, I think, in the years 
since Eunomia was first published, moved more and more explicitly in that direction: 
whilst, for example, the influence of authors such as Foucault is evident in his 
assertion that “[t]o make theory is to make society.  To dominate theory is to 
dominate social power.  To defeat theory is to defeat a structure of power”,161 his 
much more recent claim that “[i]f you say that there cannot be ideas that are separate 
from power and that all you are doing is joining in power in a rather devious, clever 
way, then I despair”162 is a clear renunciation of that heritage.  The implicit 
foundationalism of his work has driven him to explicit foundationalist beliefs, despite 
the promise to the contrary in the early stages of Eunomia. 
 
                                                 
159 Koskenniemi, loc. cit. n. 7, at p. 340. 
160 I noted above (supra, n. 86 and accompanying text) Koskenniemi’s claim that Allott’s voice was 
that of Zarathustra.  I’d like to nuance that a little here, because Nietzsche’s writing, to me, avoids the 
foundationalism that Allott ultimately returns to, despite the authoritarian voice common to both.  
Zarathustra’s pronouncements, although presented in a manner that would seem to suggest that 
universal and timeless truths were being conveyed, are in fact constantly undermined in the course of 
the work.  Think, for example, of the fact that, towards the end, Zarathustra mocks himself for carrying 
the corpse of the street artist with him at the beginning; or, indeed, of the fact that the book ends with a 
beginning, a new dawn.  Or consider his frequent assertions that others seeking the perpetual becoming 
of the overman should not follow his path, but rather find their own – and only then would he come to 
them as an equal.  Thus, through the enacted becoming and the radical individualism of the book, 
Nietzsche constantly undermines the apparent objectivity and universality of Zarathustra’s assertions; 
there is nothing comparable to this in Eunomia.  In this manner, the former book retains a much more 
literary element than the latter.  
161 Allott, op. cit. n. 6, at §12.41. 
162 Allott, loc. cit. n. 1, at p. 271. 
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 To this extent, I must break ranks a little with the apparent consensus on Allott’s 
work: for it is not merely the practical potential for abuse that his totalising vision of 
society that makes me uncomfortable;163 I am also, ultimately, unsympathetic to his 
general project at the most fundamental level.  In this, I disagree with Carty’s 
assertion that Allott’s work is concerned with that which “can only be expressed in 
the language of metaphor”:164 the effect of the metaphorical equivalencies that he 
constructs is to point away from the multiplicity of literary voice and back towards the 
singularity of the Philosophical one.  It is only the authority for his claims that Allott 
seeks to construct through the exploitation of literary technique; the claims 
themselves remain those of the “great tradition” in which the author seeks to locate 
himself.  Allott’s use of literature invites, indeed compels, the kind of examination 
that I have performed in this paper; that same examination, however, itself compels 
the conclusion that the literary elements of the work are introduced in service of an 
ideal that is not their own, as a means of constructing authority in an area in which 
standard academic argumentation has failed.  For, in the final analysis, Eunomia is 
not, as Carty suggests, “something to do with literature and rhetoric, something 
spiritual”;165 rather, it is literature in the service of Philosophy, a vocabulary and a 
paradigm subordinated and harnessed to a set of purposes that are quite alien to it.  
The search for a response to the critical challenge, then, emphatically does not end 
with Eunomia; we must look elsewhere for an understanding of the international legal 
order based on the ubiquity and irreducibility of the aporia that drive it. 
 
 
                                                 
163 On this, see e.g. Outi Korhonen, International Law Situated: An Analysis of the Lawyer's Stance 
towards Culture, History and Community (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000); See also the 
review of this book by Andreas Paulus, in 12 European Journal of International Law (2001) 1027-
1029. 
164 See Carty’s comments in “Thinking Another World”, loc. cit. n. 1, at p. 276. 
165 Ibid. 
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